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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to analyze different value drivers and their capability of 
explaining future stock returns. The value drivers are evaluated based on their 
performance using backward- and forward-looking data. The forward-looking value 
drivers are tested both with perfect foresight, i.e. actual future fundamentals, and with 
analyst forecasts. The main objective is to find the best value drivers that can be used 
to create automatic stock recommendations based on future forecasts. Finally, the 
performance of these auto-recommendations is compared against the performance of 
analysts’ own consensus stock recommendations.
DATA
In this study, the US stock market data is used as the primary source of data. The data 
is gathered from Compustat and CRSP databases and it covers years 1975-2007. In 
total, the sample consists of 98,688 company-year combinations. The average number 
of stocks in a single year is 2,990. This data is complemented with equity analyst 
forecasts and recommendations gathered from I/B/E/S database. 
RESULTS
The main finding of this study is that the P/E ratio and to some extent the PEG ratio are 
good forward-looking value drivers that provide significant stock screening potential 
when applied to earnings forecasts of good quality. However, when applying analyst 
consensus forecasts these value drivers do no result in significantly better performance 
than using only backward-looking value drivers with historical financial figures.
Despite the relatively low performance in absolute terms the auto-recommendations
made with the value driver approach outperform significantly the consensus 
recommendations of the analysts. As a conclusion, investors and analysts would be 
better off making recommendations based on systematic value drivers rather than the 
current ad-hoc methods. 
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ENNUSTEISIIN PERUSTUVIEN ARVOAJUREIDEN TOIMINTA OSAKEVALINNASSA 
Automaattisten osakesuositusten laatiminen tulevaisuuden ennusteista
TUTKIMUKSEN TARKOITUS
Tutkimuksen tarkoitus on vertailla eri arvoajureita (value driver) ja niiden kykyä 
selittää tulevaisuuden osaketuottoja. Arvoajureita analysoidaan käyttäen sekä 
toteutuneita tilinpäätöstietoja että tulevaisuuden ennusteisiin liittyvää dataa. 
Tulevaisuuteen katsovat arvoajurit testataan sekä tulevaisuuden toteutuneilla luvuilla 
eli ns. täydellisillä ennusteilla että tavanomaisilla analyytikkojen konsensusennusteilla. 
Tutkimuksen päätavoite on löytää parhaat arvoajurit, joita voidaan käyttää 
automaattisten osakesuositusten tekemiseen tulevaisuuden ennusteiden pohjalta. 
Lopuksi näiden automaattisuositusten kannattavuutta verrataan analyytikoiden omien 
konsensussuositusten kannattavuuteen. 
AINEISTO
Pääasiallisena lähteenä tässä tutkimuksessa käytetään tietoja Yhdysvaltojen 
osakemarkkinoilta. Tiedot on kerätty Compustat ja CRSP tietokannoista vuosilta 1975-
2007. Yhteensä tutkimusotoksessa on 98 688 osake-vuosi-yhdistelmää ja keskimäärin 
otoksessa on 2 990 osaketta kutakin vuotta kohden. Aineistoa täydennetään 
analyytikkoennusteiden ja –suositusten suhteen IBES tietokannalla. 
TULOKSET
Tutkimuksen päätulos on, että P/E –luku ja tietyissä määrin myös PEG –luku ovat 
hyviä tulevaisuuteen katsovia arvoajureita, ja ne osoittavat selkeää potentiaalia 
osakevalinnan työkaluksi, jos käytettävissä on korkealaatuisia ennusteita. Kun näihin 
arvoajureihin sovelletaan analyytikoiden konsensusennusteita, näiden kannattavuus 
kuitenkin heikkenee merkittävästi eikä ennusteisiin perustuva osakevalintamenetelmä 
enää johdakaan parempaan lopputulokseen kuin pelkkiin toteutuneisiin lukuihin 
perustuva menetelmä. Tästä huolimatta arvoajureiden avulla lasketut
automaattisuositukset ovat selkeästi parempia kuin analyytikoiden omat 
konsensussuositukset. Yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että sijoittajat ja analyytikot 
voisivat parantaa suositusten kannattavuutta merkittävästi, jos he käyttäisivät
systemaattista arvoajureihin perustuvaa lähestymistapaa nykyisten menetelmien sijasta. 
AVAINSANAT
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1 INTRODUCTION
Forecasting is always difficult, but still thousands of equity analysts all over the world try to 
predict the future stock prices every day. There is a wide body of academic literature available 
on predicting future stock prices using backward-looking financial figures. These studies are 
focused on finding stock market anomalies, which could be used to gain abnormal profits in 
the long-run. Moreover, numerous studies have been made on the predicting abilities of equity 
analysts and the usefulness of their forecasts and recommendations. In these studies the 
researchers discuss the interesting biases in the analyst forecasts and the conflicts of interests 
between the analysts and the investors. 
From the viewpoint of an investor willing to conduct extensive fundamental analysis based on 
future forecasts these streams of literature seem to provide somewhat conflicting results. The 
market anomaly studies provide a nice starting point for the investor in terms of what to 
forecast and how to interpret the results, but it raises an obvious question: if one can achieve 
statistically significant abnormal profits by just looking at historical financial figures, how 
high abnormal profits could one achieve by taking into account forecasts about the future 
performance of the company? The equity analyst related literature answers this question by 
simply saying: not much. For many different reasons, the forecasts and recommendations 
made by the equity analysts are strongly biased and thus the performance of equity analysts is 
generally not very flattering. However, a self-confident (or over-confident) investor can easily 
believe that she will be able to outperform the equity analysts because there are no conflicts of 
interest between her analyses and her investment decisions. This brings us to the key questions 
of this study: if an investor strongly believes that her forecasts are unbiased estimates on the 
most likely future scenario, what investment strategy should she follow to get the most out of 
them? What forward-looking value drivers should the investor use to screen stocks in these 
circumstances? As an answer, I try to find the best forward-looking value drivers that could be 
used to make auto-recommendations based on the user’s own forecasts.
However, the practical relevance of this study is not confined to over-confident investors who 
think they can predict the future perfectly. I apply the auto-recommendation model to equity 
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analysts’ consensus forecasts and show that the auto-recommendations clearly outperform the 
consensus recommendations of the equity analysts themselves. This implies that although both 
the forecasts and the recommendations of the equity analysts are heavily biased, the analysts 
seem to do a better job in making the forecasts than the recommendations. A possible reason 
for this phenomenon is that in making the forecasts the analyst can focus only on company 
specific issues. When making the recommendation, however, the analyst must take into 
account the current price of the stock and its relative profitability compared to other stocks on 
the market. The other practical implication of this study is that analysts could use a decision-
aid tool, such as the auto-recommendation model suggested in this study, in making the final 
stock recommendations. Alternatively, investors could themselves improve the quality of the 
analyst recommendations by feeding the analyst forecasts into the auto-recommendation 
model.
From a theoretical viewpoint, this study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I use 
the perfect foresight method, which is rarely used in this kind of studies. The value driver 
literature has mainly focused on backward-looking value drivers or occasionally using analyst 
forecasts as a proxy for future performance. A possible reason for this is that the practical 
relevance of such a study is not very clear. In this sense, this study has some links to 
behavioral finance as well, where investors have been proven to be overconfident when 
making forecasts and investment decisions. Fully rational investors would probably not spend 
a lot of resources in trying to make as good forecasts as possible when considering the 
difficulties and uncertainties involved. Despite the obvious difficulty people still try to make 
these forecasts and this study suggests a framework for those people to apply when making 
investment decision based on the forecasts. 
Secondly, this study contributes to the equity analyst literature by studying the interconnection 
between analyst forecasts and recommendations. A few studies related to this matter have 
been made, but the research field is still very young. On the basis of my findings I suggest a 
value driver based framework to analyze whether the analyst has got the forecast or the 
recommendation or both right. The framework could be used to further study the different
biases in the analyst forecasts and recommendations.
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1.1 Research problem and purpose
The purpose of this study is to develop an auto-recommendation model, which would produce 
higher than average stock returns based on a set of forward-looking value drivers. The 
objective is to find the best value drivers that distribute the stocks into portfolios so that the 
difference in stock returns between the buy and the sell portfolio is as large as possible. In 
other words, the return of an investment strategy, where the investor has a long position in the 
buy portfolio and a short position in the sell portfolio, is maximized. 
The research question in this study is:
”What forward-looking value drivers provide the best basis for investment strategy given the 
most accurate, unbiased forecasts available?”
The research problem is complemented with four sub-questions. 
 Based on existing literature, which value drivers show the best potential for explaining 
future stock returns?
 What is the level of value driver performance using only backward-looking value 
drivers, i.e. what is the minimum level of performance expected from forward-looking 
value drivers?
 Which value drivers perform the best when perfect foresight is applied, i.e. what is the 
maximum level of performance that someone can achieve by using the value drivers?
 What is the value driver performance when analyst consensus forecasts are applied in
generating the auto-recommendations? How do the value driver generated auto-
recommendations compare with analysts’ consensus recommendations?
The first sub-question is designed to outline the most influential value drivers on which the 
following analyses can later be focused. The purpose of the study is not to test every possible 
value driver, but choose small set of potential drivers that also have a strong theoretical link to 
the value of the firm. The second sub-question allows us to establish a lower limit of the value 
- 4 -
driver performance that the following analyses have to exceed. There is no sense in making 
difficult forecasts if you can accomplish the same level of performance with historical values. 
The third sub-question is the key to the main research question. Here the value drivers are 
tested with best forecasts available, namely the actualized future financial figures. This 
analysis reveals to us the value drivers that work best when estimates are unbiased and 
perfectly accurate. The analysis also determines the maximum level of performance that one 
could get ever achieve by using these value drivers. Real forecasts will naturally underperform 
dramatically, but still this measure could be used as one kind of benchmark as a measure of 
forecast accuracy. The last sub-question is related to the practical application of the value 
drivers with real analyst forecasts. Now the performance of the analyst forecasts can be 
compared to the backward-looking value drivers and the value drivers using perfect foresight. 
Moreover, the performance of the auto-recommendations derived using the value drivers is 
compared to the performance of the real consensus recommendations given by the analysts.
1.2 Limitations of the study
The study has a number of limitations that must be taken into account when interpreting the 
results. First, I focus in this study only on value drivers that consist of items that are 
considered analyzable. This means that the item used in calculating the value driver must be 
commonly forecasted by the equity analysts or at least it could be forecasted by the equity 
analysts. Items such as the volatility or trading volume are excluded, because they can be 
considered as unpredictable as the stock price itself. Since I am trying to explain stock prices 
using the value drivers, the future stock price can not be a part of the value driver either. 
Furthermore, dividends are excluded for the same reason because the item is already 
calculated in the stock return. 
Secondly, the perfect foresight method used in the study does not take into account any 
common biases that might be related to making forecasts. However, this is rather a
characteristic of the method than a limitation, because I explicitly wanted to bypass any biases 
caused by the analyst data. Anyway, one should keep in mind that when choosing the value 
drivers using analyst data, the drivers are also ranked according to their capability of handling 
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the biased data. In the domain of perfect foresight, on the other hand, any systematic bias in 
the forecasts could possibly lead to a much worse outcome that expected.
Thirdly, the data used in the study suffers from database related issues such as selection biases
that are common in these kinds of studies. These limitations are discussed in more detail in 
section 3.2. Finally, the data in this study is restricted to US companies only, but other studies 
suggest that results derived from the US markets can usually be extended to other markets as 
discussed in section 3.2.1.  
1.3 Structure of the study
The structure of the study is the following. In Chapter 2 the existing literature is reviewed and 
the potential value drivers are identified for further analyses. Chapter 3 describes the data and 
methodology used in the study. Chapter 5 begins with examining the backward-looking value 
drivers and establishing a lower boundary for the portfolio returns in the next analyses. 
Chapter 5 goes on to study the performance of the forward-looking value drivers using perfect 
foresight and thus establishing the upper boundary for the portfolio returns. Chapter 6 begins 
the second phase of the study where the analyst data is applied to the forward-looking value 
drivers. First, the profitability of the auto-recommendations created by using analyst forecasts 
is examined separately and then the profitability of auto-recommendations is compared against 
analyst consensus recommendations. Chapter 7 concludes and makes suggestions for future 
research.
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2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND CHOICE OF VALUE DRIVERS
There previous studies related to this study can be categorized in three streams of literature. 
First of all, a vast amount of literature deals with building screening models for portfolio 
formation. However, most of these studies use only historical financial figures, and thus
concentrate on identifying stock market anomalies, i.e. market inefficiencies that anybody 
could utilize in gaining abnormal profits. The second stream of literature related to this study 
focuses on accounting based value drivers. Again researchers try to find value drivers that 
would explain abnormal stock returns, but this time the focus is on accounting items rather 
than the classical ratios such as the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio. Although many of the value 
drivers tested in this study are taken from the classical anomaly studies, the spirit of this study 
is closer to the accounting literature. Here, instead of finding market anomalies, the objective 
is to identify which items drive the value of a company so that the managers could focus their 
actions on maximizing the right accounting measures. In this study, the same information is 
used to find profitable investment strategies based on the company’s expected ability reach
these measures. Finally, the third stream of literature is related to professional equity analysts 
and the usefulness of their forecasts and recommendations in achieving abnormal profits. 
Much of this literature is focused on the biases in the analyst forecasts and the conflicts of 
interests that cause them. However, some of these studies also use the analyst forecasts in 
deriving forward-looking value drivers, which provide an interesting benchmark for the 
second phase of this study, where analyst forecasts are used to see how well the value drivers 
perform under biased equity analyst forecasts.
2.1 Streams of literature related to the study
2.1.1 Anomaly studies
Quickly after the introducing the market efficiency theory in 1960s, researchers started to find 
evidence that contradicted the efficient market hypothesis. In the 1990s, the burdening amount 
of evidence on market inefficiencies led to the emergence of behavioral finance in the 
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mainstream of finance literature. These empirical studies searched for any backward-looking 
value drivers that had explanatory power over the future stock returns. The efficient market 
hypothesis claimed that all public information is already reflected in the stock prices and thus
nobody should be able to find backward-looking value drivers that could explain the stock 
returns. As mentioned above, however, the researchers found several market anomalies that 
should have been arbitraged away if the markets would have been efficient in the classical 
sense. These include, for example, the small market capitalization anomaly, the net stock issue 
anomaly, the positive price momentum anomaly, and the positive earnings momentum 
anomaly (see Fama and French (2008) for a recent survey on different anomalies). However, 
in this study we are interested in value drivers that can be turned into forward-looking by 
incorporating future forecasts into them. In this particular field, the most well known market 
anomalies are the price-to-book (P/B) anomaly and the price-to-earnings (P/E) anomaly. These 
anomalies are commonly known also as the value vs. growth anomaly, because the issue 
usually boils down to steady value companies outperforming more exotic growth companies. 
The thoroughly researched value vs. growth anomaly provides this study with a necessary 
framework for sorting stocks according to the chosen value drivers. 
As early as 1977, Basu proved empirically that stocks with low P/E ratio generated higher 
average returns compared to stocks with high P/E ratios. Later the same result has been 
repeated in dozens of other studies (see e.g. Chan et al., 1991, Fama and French, 1992, and 
Lakonishok et al., 1994). The results were not in line with Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) developed a decade earlier (Sharpe, 1964 and Lintner, 1965), because the stocks with 
low P/E ratios did not appear any riskier at least when examined with traditional risk 
measures. Thus, a lot of academic interest was attached to this matter.  In 1984, Rosenberg et 
al. showed that also price-to-book (P/B) ratio seemed to explain stock market returns. Again, 
other researchers quickly confirmed the results, and the abnormal returns gained by the P/B 
ratio seemed to be even higher than the returns achieved by using the P/E ratio (see e.g. Chan 
et. al, 1991, Fama and French, 1992, and Lakonishok et al., 1994). Actually, Fama and French 
(1992) started a stream of literature where the anomalies were studied thoroughly with cross-
section regressions. In this method the regression model is used to predict future stock returns, 
for example, over the next year. The independent variables in the model were backward-
- 8 -
looking value drivers such as the P/B or the P/E ratio. As a result of the regression, they got 
the best value drivers that explained the future stock returns. These studies irrefutably showed 
that value stocks outperformed growth stocks and the best driver to dissect value stocks 
seemed to be the P/B ratio. As mentioned earlier, under growing evidence the market 
efficiency defenders finally had to admit that value stocks generate higher profits than growth 
stocks. However, the next logical argument was that the value stocks are just riskier and the 
higher return is a result of higher risk. The discussion goes on still today, but so far nobody 
has been able to develop a risk measure that could properly explain the difference in the 
returns (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). 
There is another important anomaly that is related to the value vs. growth anomaly and the 
approach used in this study. Banz (1981) was the first to report that stocks with low market 
capitalization, i.e. small companies, produce higher stock returns than large companies. 
Although the market capitalization is surely not among the good forward-looking value 
drivers, it has relevance over this study as well. The high returns of small companies tend to 
disturb the results if small companies dominate some portfolios. Therefore, many of the value 
vs. growth studies report the results separately for small, medium and large companies. In this 
study, the companies are analyzed together in order to maximize the number of companies in 
the sample but the effect of size anomaly is closely monitored and, whenever needed, the size 
effect is documented using additional analyses.
This study takes advantage of the anomaly literature in two important ways. First, the existing
literature is used to screen suitable value drivers that have been proved to work with historical 
financial statement data. Any anomaly already present in the value driver creates a good 
starting point for adding information about future financial figures. Combinations that utilize 
the historical market anomaly and add future expectations on top of that are particularly 
interesting in the context of this study, because there is evidence that equity analysts generally 
take advantage of these anomalies only to a certain extent in making their recommendations 
(Stickel, 2007). The most relevant value drivers studied in this field of literature are presented 
in section 2.2.
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The methods used in this study follow quite closely the methods developed in the anomaly 
literature. The cross-section regression in the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) has been the 
prevalent study method in this field of literature after it was first applied by Fama and French 
(1992). However, the functional form of the regression is not very useful in practical 
applications. Thus, most of the studies include also a sorting model, which is used in this study 
as well. The sorting method allows creating simple ranking rules that are easy to apply in 
practice. Fama and French (2008) report that the cross-section regression method and the 
sorting method lead generally in similar results. The chosen method of this study is described
in detail section 3.1.
A vast majority of the anomaly literature has limited the value drivers to historical 
fundamentals only. Some studies use analyst forecasts as proxies for future expectations. 
However, the perfect foresight approach used in this study has been very rarely applied in 
these kinds of studies. Grauer (2008) uses the future actualized returns in determining optimal 
asset allocation strategies between stocks and Treasury bills. Moreover, Arnott et al. (2008) 
use actualized future cash distributions in determining ex post realized value of individual 
stocks and compare these to the original stock price. However, in my knowledge there are no 
studies that would use the perfect foresight method in acquiring future financial statement data 
and test the performance forward-looking value drivers based on these figures.
2.1.2 Accounting literature
The accounting literature related to this study is quite close to the anomaly studies presented 
above. The study by Ou and Penman (1989) can be considered as the seminal work in this 
field of literature. Other key studies are, for example, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Haugen 
and Baker (1996). The differences between the anomaly and the accounting literature arise 
from the motivation of the researchers and the scope of value drivers that are tested. The 
primary motive of these studies is not to prove market efficiency theory right or wrong but to 
find the best managerial measures that drive the value of the company. In other words,
researchers examine what financial characteristics unite successful companies in terms of 
stock returns. The practical implication of these studies is a suggestion that managers should 
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focus on maximizing these value drivers in order to create shareholder value. The scope of 
value drivers included in these studies is much wider than in the anomaly studies. Basically, 
any income statement, balance sheet or cash flow statement item is a potential value driver in 
this stream of literature. When a typical market anomaly study concentrates around a few key 
figures, the accounting studies include up to 50 different value drivers. 
In this study, the accounting literature is utilized to establish a large value drive base from 
which the final value drivers to be tested in the study are selected. The wide range of possible 
value drivers enables us to choose value drivers that have a strong link to the valuation theory 
and that have been proven to explain stock returns in the previous studies. However, the 
negative side of many accounting based value drivers is that they have been derived from very 
detailed financial items, and thus they could be extremely difficult to forecast. Moreover, 
some of the value drivers found significant in these studies make little sense in terms of 
financial theory. Indeed, these kinds of studies have been accused of data snooping bias, 
where one is bound to find some correlation with stock returns when enough value drivers are 
tested. The most relevant value drivers found in this stream of literature are presented in 
section 2.2.
2.1.3 Analyst forecasts literature
The third stream of literature related to this study is focused on equity analysts. The purpose of 
the equity analysts is to outsource demanding analysis work of the investors and provide the
investors with good investment advice. From very early on researchers have been interested in 
the profitability of the analyst recommendations. Quickly, however, it was clear that the 
analyst recommendations do not result in significant abnormal profits (Cowles, 1933), and the 
earnings forecasts of equity analysts seemed to be systematically biased upwards (Fried and 
Givoly, 1982, O’Brian, 1988). Much of the literature has therefore been devoted to 
understanding why analysts perform so badly in making their forecasts. The researchers have 
identified many conflicts of interest between the analysts and the investors that cause these 
biases. Comprehensive articles surveying the literature on conflicts of interests between 
analysts and investors have been written by Brown (1993) and Ramnath (2008). Because of 
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the commonly known poor quality of the analyst forecasts, the value drivers are tested in this 
study also using the perfect foresight method.
In the context of this study, the analyst literature is important for two reasons. First, it is a 
good source of studies testing forward-looking value drivers. The value drivers in these studies 
are calculated using equity analyst forecasts as the best approximate for future financial 
figures. The most commonly used item is earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts. In the second 
phase of this study, the value drivers identified with perfect foresight method are tested with 
actual analyst forecasts. These results can be compared against other studies in this field of 
literature. Moreover, the results provide a lower limit of returns that any investor making 
unbiased forecasts herself should be able to gain, if the she devotes enough time and resources 
to the task. In addition, using the value drivers to create auto-recommendations from analyst 
forecasts enables us to study the interconnection between analyst forecasts and 
recommendations. The connection has not yet been very thoroughly studied in the existing 
literature (Bradshaw, 2002). 
2.2 Value drivers in the existing literature
One of the main purposes of the literature review is to provide a list of potential value drivers 
to be tested in this study. In this section the most significant value drivers studied in the 
existing literature are presented and the ones to be tested in the study are chosen. The criteria 
for a good value driver to be tested are the following:
 The value driver is empirically proven to have significance in explaining future stock 
returns.
 The value driver must have a logical connection to the value of the company.
 The future fundamentals needed to calculate the value driver must be analyzable in 
terms that they are commonly analyzed by the equity analysts, or at least they could be 
analyzed by the equity analysts.
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The meaning of the first criterion is to take advantage of the existing literature in restricting
the number of possible value drivers only to the most significant ones. The second criterion 
ensures that the chosen value driver makes sense to other people as well. This is important for 
any practical applications that could be developed on the basis of this study. The requirement 
of logical connection also reduces the risk of data snooping bias, where some arbitrary value 
driver could accidentally correlate to stock returns in this particular data set. Finally, the future 
looking value drivers must be based on items that can be forecasted. Items like stock issues 
and positive price momentum are excluded because predicting them is considered to be
impossible. For any practical applications, it would be advantageous if the item would be 
commonly analyzed by equity analysts. This does not, however, mean that in the second phase 
of this study the future fundamentals should be restricted to those available in the analyst data. 
Today equity analysts forecast a much wider selection of fundamentals than for which long 
time-series are available. However, it is important to test at least some forward-looking value 
drivers that can be calculated from the analyst data in order to conduct the second phase of this 
study. 
Table 1 contains a list of studies which test the explanatory power of different value drivers on 
stock prices. The list is not all-inclusive, but the most significant studies of the different 
streams of literature presented above should be included. The value drivers presented in the 
table are not as straightforward as would seem. The different studies use slightly different 
compositions of the value drivers, but in this table they are all gathered under the same 
primary value drivers. For example, price-to-earnings ratio and earnings-to-price ratio are both 
reported under price-to-earnings, which is the selected composition in this study. Finally, the 
value drivers that have been shown to result in statistically significant abnormal returns are 
marked with “S” in the table. However, no direct conclusions can be made because the studies 
vary considerably in terms of their sample, statistical methods and significance levels. Since 
the list is not all-inclusive and some other rough approximations have been done in preparing 
the table, one should not make too far reaching conclusions about the capabilities of the 
different value drivers on the basis of Table 1. However, the most important value drivers still 
clearly stand out in terms of their frequency and statistical significance.
Table 1 Articles studying different value drivers and their explanatory power over stock returns
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Abarbanell & Bushee 1997 S S S S S S S
Ahmed & Nanda 2001 S S S
Barber & Lyon 1997 S S
Basu 1997 S
Beneish, Lee & Tarpley 2001 S x x S S S S x S x S S x x
Bradshaw 2004 S S
Chan, Hamao & Lakonishik 1991 S S S S S
Chan, Jegadeesh & Lakonishok 1995 S
Chan & Lakonishok 2004 S S S S S
Daniel & Titman 1997 S
Easton 2004 S
Easton & Monahan 2005 x x x x
Fama & French 1992 S S x x x x
Fama & French 1996 S S S x
Fama & French 2008 S S S S S S
Ferson & Harvey 1999 S S x x x S x
Frankel & Lee 1998 S S
Haugen & Baker 1996 S x S x S x x x x S x x x S x x S
Lamont 1998 S S S
LaPorta 1996 x x x S
LaPorta, Lakoshnik, Shleifer & Vishny 1997 S
Leledakis & Davidson 2001 S S
Lev & Thiagarajan 1993 S S S S S S S S S
Liu, Nissim & Thomas 2002 S S S x x S S S S
Miles & Timmermann 1996 S x x x x x
Ou & Penman 1989 S S S S S S S S S S
Piotroski 2000 S S S S S S S S
Setiono & Strong 1998 S S S S S S S S
Some of the most important articles testing different value drivers are listed in this table. The articles are in alphabetical and order and the value drivers tested in the article are specified in the table. The 
value drivers tested in the study are marked with "x". If the driver is statistically tested and found statistically significant, the marker is changed to "S". The list is not comprehensive and not all value drivers 
tested in articles are necessarily listed.
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As we can see in Table 1, the most commonly studied drivers are the P/E and the P/B ratio by 
far. The use of these value drivers follows the academic interest in value vs. growth anomaly.
The P/E ratio can be made forward-looking quite easily by either using future earnings in 
calculating the ratio or adding the growth factor in the ratio, i.e. using the PEG ratio. The PEG 
ratio is much less well studied than the plain P/E ratio, but the results are quite promising (see 
e.g. Bradshaw, 2002 and Easton, 2004). The P/B ratio is backward-looking and using the 
analyst forecasts in it is more difficult. However, as mentioned in section 2.1.1, the P/B ratio 
outperforms the P/E ratio as a measure for the value vs. growth anomaly. 
Beyond these two intensively studied value drivers, the rest are somewhat less commonly 
studied. The cash flow-to-price measure is also quite frequently studied and it has been shown 
to explain stock prices. However, the link between regular earnings and cash flow measure is 
usually quite strong and the advantage of the figure is usually associated in dissecting good 
accounting measures from bad ones. In the right part of the table there are many accounting 
items mentioned of which most have been found to have some correlation with the stock 
prices. Although, for example, high R&D costs might unite good companies, this can hardly 
be considered as a good forward-looking value driver. It is difficult to imagine that by 
devoting a lot of time into forecasting the company’s R&D costs for the following year, one 
could gain insights that are not already present in the backward-looking value drivers. 
Therefore, most of the accounting based value drivers are discarded because of lacking
analytical value and missing link to valuation theory. However, the different profitability 
figures stand out as one important group that has emerged from the accounting literature. 
Profit margin, ROA and ROE are found significant in many other studies as well. From these 
value drivers ROE offers the best theoretical link to the value of the company. 
The strongest link to the finance theory of all the value drivers is probably included in the
residual income. The studies often use complicated discounting structures, which make it
difficult to apply in practice. A more straightforward method of just replacing earnings in the 
P/E ratio with residual income that incorporates the cost of capital could be interesting also in 
the context of this study.
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Finally, there are a number of other value drivers in the list that might show potential, but they 
are omitted because of the method applied in this study. First, the dividend return shows clear 
potential as a value driver, but making it forward-looking under perfect foresight creates an 
auto-correlation issue. The future dividends may explain the stock returns, but they are also 
part of the variable explained.  Other omitted value drivers include unpredictable items such as 
volatility, stock issues and price momentum as mentioned in section 2.1.1.
2.3 Choosing the value drivers for testing
In Table 2, the most significant value drivers identified in the previous section are gathered 
together and compared numerically. For each value driver some of the most important studies
testing the performance of the driver are listed in Table 2. In all of these studies the stocks are 
sorted according to the value driver and the portfolio performance is reported. In Table 2 I 
have calculated the performance of an investment strategy where the investor would have a 
long position in the highest ranking portfolio and a short position in the lowest ranking 
portfolio. The returns are annualized to one year. The actual buy-and-hold periods in the 
studies change from daily rebalancing to 36 months. Therefore, in interpreting the results one 
must remain very precautious. The studies have used different methods in calculating the 
returns in other areas as well. For example, the sources of data, geographical focus, sample 
periods and many other important issues differ between the studies. Finally, some studies have 
not reported the buy vs. short return difference and therefore I have calculated that myself. In 
studies with more complicated portfolio structures the calculation method is not entirely 
straightforward and some differences might arise due to my calculations as well. Nevertheless, 
these results provide some indication which value drivers could provide the best potential
according to the previous studies.
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Table 2 Performance of value drivers in the existing literature
Value Driver Study Data Hedge Return
P/B
based on historical figures
Fama & French 1992 US (1962-89) 21.27%
Frankel & Lee 1998 US (1975-1993) 4.90%
Leledakis & Davidson 2001 UK (1980-1996) 18.84%
Miles & Timmermann 1996 UK (1975-1990) 9.90%
Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny 1994 US (1963-90) 7.30%
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 1991 JP (1971-88) 14.03%
P/E
based on historical figures
Fama & French 1992 US(1962-89) 9.90%
Basu 1977 US 1957-71 6.96%
Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny 1994 US (1963-90) 3.90%
Miles & Timmermann 1996 UK (1975-1990) 3.17%
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 1991 JP (1971-88) 4.91%
based on analyst forecasts
Frankel & Lee 1998 US (1975-1993) 3.01%
Size
based on historical figures
Fama & French 1992 US (1962-89) 9.51%
Frankel & Lee 1998 US (1975-1993) -0.01%
Leledakis & Davidson 2001 UK (1980-1996) 21.60%
Miles & Timmermann 1996 UK (1975-1990) 1.94%
P/B and Size
based on historical figures
Fama & French 1992 US (1962-89) 12.55%
Daniel & Titman 1997 US (1963-93) 9.51%
PE & Growth
based on historical figures
Ahmed & Nanda 2001 US (1982-97) 11.10%
Growth
based on analyst forecasts
La Porta 1996 US (1982-91) -20.90%
ROE
based on historical figures
Fama & French 2008 US (1963-2005) 2.30%
Sales growth 
based on historical figures
Frankel & Lee 1998 US (1975-1993) -7.80%
The table summarizes the performance of different value drivers in the existing literature. The difference between 
buy and sell portfolio returns (hedge return) is reported for each study. When the data is not directly available, 
similar figure has been manually calculated. Returns in studies using longer or shorter buy-and-hold periods than 
one year have been annualized. Studies differ in many ways from each other (data, number of portfolios, 
methods etc.) and thus comparing the studies with each other should be done with caution. The value drivers 
studied in the same study are more comparable.
(Table 2 continues)
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Value Driver Study Data Hedge Return
P/S
based on historical figures
Leledakis & Davidson 2001 UK (1980-1996) 18.60%
Long-term growth
based on analyst forecasts
Frankel & Lee 1998 US (1975-1993) 6.50%
D/E ratio
based on historical figures
Leledakis & Davidson 2001 UK (1980-1996) 15.24%
Miles & Timmermann 1996 UK (1975-1990) 3.41%
P/CF
based on historical figures
Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny 1994 US (1963-90) 9.90%
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 1991 Japan (1971-88) 10.03%
P/Div
based on historical figures
Miles & Timmermann 1996 UK (1975-1990) -1.90%
(Table 2 continues)
2.3.1 Price-to-book ratio and return on equity
As we can see from Table 2, the P/B ratio leads to highest return in almost any study. The 
companies with low P/B ratios outperform the high P/B companies by a wide margin. It is 
very natural to include this value driver in this study. However, P/B ratio offers only little 
room for forward-looking components. The book value next year can be used, but the effect of 
one year profit performance is very low on P/B ratio. It can be expected that the effect of 
adding perfect foresight to this value driver will not increase the performance of the value 
driver significantly. Thus, in the context of this study it would be interesting to add some 
forward-looking fundamental to this value driver. The best option for this seems to be return 
on equity (ROE). ROE reflects the company’s current or future profitability. ROE has been 
shown to explain stock returns in many accounting studies (Ou and Penman, 1989 and Haugen 
and Barker, 1996, and Liu et al., 2002). 
A combination of P/B ratio and ROE is quite interesting for this study. Such a linkage has 
been suggested by, for example, Clubb and Naffi (2007). The logical link between P/B ratio 
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and ROE is that P/B can be interpreted as a measure of profitability expectations. When P/B 
ratio is below 1 the company is expected to destroy shareholder value. When the ratio is 
higher than 1, the company is expected to create shareholder value in the future. ROE, on the 
other hand, is a measure of profitability. If the next year’s ROE is higher than the cost of 
equity (expected by shareholders), the company creates value and vice versa. In other words, 
the combination of P/B and ROE creates a framework where a company is allowed to have a 
high P/B ratio (implying high profitability expectations) and still be included in the “buy” 
portfolio, if the subsequent ROE forecasts are high as well. Companies with high P/B ratio can 
be also good investments if they actually meet or exceed the high expectations already present 
in the stock price. Alternatively, companies with low P/B ratios are not necessarily good 
investments if the forecasted ROE is also significantly below the cost of capital. From the 
viewpoint of this study the combination of P/B ratio and ROE is interesting, because it 
includes the best performing value driver identified in the value vs. growth literature and also
a forward-looking component ROE, which can be clearly linked to the original value driver.
However, the mathematic formula used to link these two figures is very problematic. Since 
both figures use the book value of the company as their denominators, there is risk of turning 
the figure into normal price-to-earnings related value driver. The issue is discussed further in 
section 4.2.1.
Naturally, the ROE is tested also separately as it has shown explanatory power in the previous 
studies. The negative aspect of ROE as such is that the valuation level of the stocks is not 
reflected in the driver through the current price. Therefore, the value driver does not take into 
account whether the level profitability is already reflected in the price or not. Final value 
driver related to the P/B ratio and profitability is the debt-to-equity ratio (D/E). Researchers 
have found that companies with high leverage tend to outperform companies with low 
leverage. However, similarly to the P/B ratio the problem with D/E ratio is its lacking 
capability of capturing much forward-looking information in it. 
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2.3.2 Price-to-earnings ratio and growth
The next interesting value driver is the P/E ratio. Although the value driver has been shown to 
result in abnormal profits, it seems to underperform the P/B ratio in almost every study where 
both value drivers are tested. The effect is still clear; the companies with low P/E ratios 
significantly outperform the high P/E companies. Despite the smaller abnormal returns, the 
P/E ratio has some significant advantages compared to the P/B ratio especially from the 
viewpoint of this study. The P/E ratio is one of the easiest value drivers for incorporating
future forecasts. Forward-looking P/E ratio is calculated simply by replacing the forecasted 
next year’s earnings in the denominator. There are other options as well. Incorporating P/E 
ratio with growth (PEG ratio) creates a similar framework as the P/B ratio and ROE.  The P/E 
ratio is generally considered to be a proxy for the growth expectations of the stock. In this 
context, the framework is usually called Growth at Reasonable Price (GARP). GARP enables
investing in companies with high P/E ratio (high growth expectations) if the forecasted growth 
is also high. On the other hand, companies with low P/E ratio are not automatically good 
investments if their forecasted growth is very low. 
The negative aspect of P/E and PEG ratios is that they create very strict requirements for the 
analyzed companies. P/E ratio works properly for only companies with positive earnings and 
thus, any companies with negative earnings must be omitted from the sample. Calculating the 
growth also creates extra requirements. Both actualized earnings in year t=0 and forecasted 
earnings in year t=1 should have the same sign. Moreover, the growth rate should be positive, 
because in calculating the PEG ratio the P/E ratio is divided by the growth rate. These
requirements decrease the data sample significantly. The problem is further discussed in 
section 4.2.1.
Also growth as such is tested in the study, but is suffers from the same drawback as ROE, i.e. 
no direct link to the current valuation level of the company. Even if companies with high 
earnings growth would result in higher stock returns, this is not the case if the future growth is 
already overemphasized in the stock price. 
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2.3.3 Residual income
The third value driver type to be tested in this study is the residual income (RI) or economic 
value added (EVA). Theoretically speaking this value driver has the strongest link to financial 
theory. RI takes into account also the cost of equity and thus, really reveals if the company is 
creating value for its shareholders or not. From the theoretical point of view, the RI should 
really drive the value of the company and at least by using perfect foresight screening 
companies according to their RI should result in abnormal profits. However, the setback of 
this value driver is that the cost of equity is extremely hard to estimate accurately even with 
perfect foresight. Previous studies in this field include Frankel and Lee (1998) and Ali et al. 
(2003), both of whom have found that their relatively complicated RI models using analyst 
forecasts results resulted in abnormal profits. In this study, a simplified version of a RI is used 
to calculate a P/RI ratio. The simplification is discussed more in depth in section 5.1.1.
2.3.4 Other value drivers
There are still many value drivers left in Table 2 that could be tested in this study. However, 
the value drivers mentioned above show the best potential in terms of buy vs. sell returns 
reported in previous studies and in terms of linkage between the value driver and financial 
theory. For future research, at least the P/CF ratio, the P/S ratio, and long-term growth provide 
excellent sources of new value drivers to be tested.
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3 METHODS AND DATA
3.1 Methods used in the study
The method used to test the different value drivers in this study is the classical sorting method. 
A widely used alternative method would be the cross-section regression in the spirit of Fama 
and MacBeth (1973). The sorting method was chosen mainly because the result of the method 
is a simplistic sorting rule, which can be easily used in practical applications. This section 
starts with discussing the choice of the research method and then the chosen sorting method is 
described in detail. 
3.1.1 Sorting vs. cross-section regression
The sorting method is very straightforward. The stocks are simply sorted by the value driver 
into portfolios and the return of each portfolio is then reported. The negative side is that only 
one or in some cases two value drivers can be studied at the same time. Moreover, the sorting 
method does not reveal much about the functional form of the relation between the value 
driver and the stock return. The interaction between different value drivers is also left in the 
dark. The advantage of the method is that it is very transparent. The method can also be easily 
implemented in any practical applications. Just by reporting the sorting criteria anybody can 
take advantage of the findings of this study. The sorting method is also more flexible in many 
ways. The calculation method of portfolio returns can be easily altered. For example, the 
portfolio returns can be calculated as average or median depending on the situation. 
In the cross-section regression the dependent variable, the future stock returns, are explained 
by the independent variables, the different value drivers. The advantage of this approach is 
that it can be simultaneously run on multiple value drivers and the interaction between 
different drivers can be examined more easily. Secondly, the method gives a functional form 
of the relation between the value driver and the stock returns. The functional form can be
utilized further and, for example, the marginal effects can be measured. However, the 
functional form is also a shortcoming. The chosen functional form might turn out to be 
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incorrect, which creates biased results. Therefore, it must be heavily tested for reliability. 
Moreover, there is a risk of emphasizing small stocks in the regression, because each company 
has to be equally weighted in the regression. Finally, also extreme values have direct effect on 
the regression coefficients and considerable effort must be put to omit outliers from the data.
Fama and French (2008) thoroughly discuss the different characteristics of both methods. 
They also conclude that both the cross-section regression and the sorting method seem to 
produce similar results when applied to the same data set. This further strengthens the case 
that the study method can be chosen in a way that enables easy practical applications. 
3.1.2 Description of the sorting method used in the study
The sorting method is used to calculate buy-and-hold period returns of one year for each of the 
stocks in the study. Each year in the study starts with financial statements that are dated at the 
end of the fiscal year of the company. The latest such date is the last day of each year 
(December 31st), which is also the most common fiscal-year end-date. However, the financial 
statements are not made publicly available on that date. Instead, it takes usually a few months 
for the company to prepare and publish the financial statements. To avoid having undisclosed 
information incorporated in the value drivers, the buy-and-hold period starts on April 1st the 
next year. In other words, it is assumed that the financial statements are published at the latest 
on March 31st. The same timeline is used in several other studies (see e.g. Lakonishok et al., 
1994). However, in some studies focused on market anomalies the quarantine period is even 
more conservative starting from July 1st (e.g. Fama and French, 1992). In the context of this 
study the three month period is considered to be long enough. The disadvantage of having a 
longer period is that the stock price in July reflects already everything that has happened in the 
first half of the year including the first quarter for most companies. The long quarantine period 
means very strong handicap for any sorting models still using reported fundamentals from the 
last year.
The price used in calculating value drivers is taken from March 31st, which is the last day 
before the start of the buy-and-hold period. In practice this means that up-to-date stock prices 
are available in creating the portfolios on April 1st. Also the number of outstanding shares is 
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taken from March 31st. Any companies delisting during the holding period are included in the 
sample in order to avoid the survivorship bias. The stock prices of these companies are 
followed as far as they are available including the delisting return (e.g. -100% for bankrupted 
companies). The stock returns on the following months after delisting are tied to S&P 500 
index in order to cause minimal disturbance on the results. 
Each year the sample is divided into five portfolios according to the value driver under 
investigation. The number of portfolios is fixed to five, because of the analogy to analyst 
recommendations. Thus, having five portfolios makes practical applications easier when the 
recommendations are already on a familiar scale. A larger number of portfolios could provide 
more detailed results about the portfolio returns, but five portfolios are considered to be 
sufficient to study whether the buy vs. sell portfolio returns differ statistically significantly. 
The results are also easier to apply later in smaller markets such as in Finland, where the 
sample will certainly not be high enough for more than five portfolios. The portfolios in this 
study are formed so that each portfolio has the same amount of stocks in it. Finally the buy-
and-hold returns of each portfolio are calculated using average or median and reported as the 
portfolio return for the year when the buy-and-hold period started in April. 
3.1.3 Diagnostics and statistical tests
As mentioned before, the main result of the sorting method is the average or median return of 
each portfolio in a given year. The yearly returns can be combined in many ways. The easiest 
way is to give each year an equal weight and just report the average portfolio returns over the 
whole time period. This method is used as the primary method in this study. There is a certain 
risk involved in it however. First, each year is given an equal weight, which means that years 
with extreme market conditions can have a dominant effect on the results. In addition, some 
information gets lost when the yearly portfolios are averaged and then the years are averaged 
again. 
Therefore, an alternative method is used to study the portfolio returns as well. Here the 
average return of all stocks is calculated for every year separately. Before sorting the stocks 
into portfolios, an abnormal return is calculated for each stock for each year. The abnormal 
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return is the difference between the stock return and the average return of all stocks in that 
year. Then the stocks are sorted into portfolios according to the value driver and instead of 
calculating a yearly average, now all the abnormal returns from all years can be combined
together, because they are adjusted against yearly changes already. The average return of each 
portfolio can be calculated as single average or median over all the stock-year combinations in 
the sample. This approach is used to conduct a t-test between the buy and sell portfolios in 
order to test whether the average abnormal returns in these portfolios differ from each other 
and whether the difference is statistically significant. The testing is performed using standard 
t-test assuming different variances. The null hypothesis in the t-test is that there is no 
difference in the stock returns of the buy and sell portfolio. The null hypothesis is rejected if 
the absolute value of the t-stat is higher than the t-stat of the required confidence level. 
The objective of a good value driver is to separate stocks into different portfolios according to 
their future stock returns. More specifically, the aim is to create a maximally wide gap 
between the highest ranking buy portfolio and the lowest ranking sell portfolio. Therefore, the 
difference in average or median returns between the buy and the hold portfolio is used as the 
most important criterion in this study. Later, this gap between the buy and sell portfolio 
returns is called the buy vs. sell return or more specifically the hedge return, as it would be the 
return of an investment strategy where the investor would have a long position in the buy 
portfolio and a short position in the sell portfolio.
Another measure of the value driver performance, particularly in the domain of perfect 
foresight, is the proportion of maximum hedge return that the value driver is able to dissect. 
The maximum hedge return is calculated by sorting the stocks according to their actualized 
future stock returns. This is the maximum return that any value driver could ever achieve by 
separating the stocks perfectly in to different portfolios based on their stock returns. Naturally, 
this is impossible even under the perfect foresight method as none of the value drivers can 
correlate with stock return perfectly. The difference of the theoretical maximum return of buy 
and sell portfolios is calculated similarly to the value driver hedge return. This analysis 
enables us to see how large proportion of the maximum gap the current value driver is able to 
generate. This measure is particularly useful in this study, because the number of stocks 
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included in each value driver test is different. All value drivers have their own data 
requirements as we will see in Chapter 4. In this study, the largest possible set of stocks is
always used to study the performance of each value driver. The proportion of theoretical 
maximum return allows us to compare the different value drivers even if the data sample is not 
entirely the same for all value drivers. 
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Geographical focus
The sorting method requires a large data sample to provide reliable results. In addition, the 
data must be comprised of long time-series, which extend over many economical cycles, 
because the performance of different value drivers might vary between upturns and 
downturns. Because of the requirement for a vast amount of data, the study is geographically 
focused on stock markets in the United States. The US stock market data provides the highest 
number of publicly traded companies and the longest observation periods in the available 
databases. Moreover, the different databases used in this study have the best coverage over US 
companies. The stock exchanges included in this study are New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and National Association for Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). These are the three most important stock exchanges in the 
US consisting the most relevant US companies.
A great majority of other studies with similar research methods have been conducted with the 
US data as well. However, there are also studies where similar tests run on US companies 
have been repeated with data from other markets. In general, the results show that the same 
principles work in the other markets as well. See e.g. Chan et al. (1991), Haugen and Baker 
(1996) and Miles and Timmermann (1996) for international evidence. Naturally all markets 
have their own characteristics, but on a general level the results of this study can be extended
to other markets as well.
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3.2.2 Selected databases
The data for this study is gathered from three different databases. First, the historical financial 
statement items are extracted from Compustat database run by Standard and Poor’s. The 
Compustat database includes all the basic items of the income statement, the balance sheet,
and the cash-flow statement. The data is detailed enough for the purposes of this study. 
The stock market data is taken from the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database, which includes a comprehensive collection of stock market data. The most important 
data items taken from CRSP are the monthly stock returns, stock prices, number of 
outstanding shares, and possible delisting returns.
Finally, the analyst forecasts and recommendations used in the second phase of this study are 
collected from the Institutional Broker’s Estimate System (IBES) database run by 
ThomsonReuters. The absolutely best coverage of all the estimate items available on the IBES
database is in the estimated earnings-per-share (EPS) item. All the other items are significantly 
less well reported in the database. Therefore, the second phase of this study relies heavily on 
the EPS-related value drivers and analyst recommendations. The EPS estimates used in the 
study are consensus figures calculated by IBES. The consensus is calculated using the average 
of individual analysts’ forecasts. Later in the study also consensus recommendations are used 
in addition to the consensus forecasts. The consensus recommendations are calculated from 
the IBES database by extracting the number of recommendations in each of the 5 possible 
categories: strong buy, buy, hold, underperform, and sell. The recommendations are 
transformed into numerical form by assigning number 1 to sell portfolio and number 5 to buy 
portfolio and calculating the respective average of individual analyst’s recommendations.
3.2.3 Length of the observation period
As mentioned above, the observation period has to be long in studies using the sort method. 
The most important reason for this is that over a long period of time single upturns or 
downturns do not dominate the results. By choosing a long observation period it can be 
ensured that the value drivers work in all kinds of market situations as expected. The 
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observation period in other studies using similar methods has been around 30 years. For 
example, Fama and French (1992) used an observation period of 27 years. As the geographical 
focus of this study is the US, there are three particularly interesting major exchanges: NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ. Since the NASDAQ is the youngest of these three exchanges, the 
observation period was selected according to it.  The NASDAQ started its operations in early 
1970s, and therefore the observation period in this study has been selected to be 1975-2007. 
The sample ends in year 2007, which means that the stock returns are calculated up to March 
2008, which represents the latest data available in the databases.
When using the analyst data, the observation period is shorter due to data availability. The 
EPS forecasts are available starting from year 1984. Thus, when analyzing the value driver 
performance with analyst forecasts the observation period is 23 years (1984-2007). The 
analyst recommendations are available in the IBES database from year 1994 on. This means 
that the observation period, when analyzing the performance of auto-recommendation 
compared to analyst recommendations, is only 13 years (1994-2007). 
3.2.4 Selecting the stocks
There are many issues that should be considered when selecting the stocks that can be used in 
the study. There should be no selection biases allowed in the selection, but still all companies 
do not qualify for the analysis. Certain industries are typically excluded from the data sample, 
because of their industry specific characteristics. In this study, banks and insurance companies 
are omitted because of their special reporting principles. The omission is based on Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC), where companies with codes 6000-6999 were omitted. 
A natural restriction in choosing the companies is the availability of the data. The issue is 
particularly problematic when different databases are combined. There is always a possibility 
of introducing a bias in the data sample, when some companies are omitted due to lack of data. 
For example, the Compustat and the CRSP databases have some differences in their company 
identification procedures. The identification method used in this study is the CUSIP 
identification code. This is the most often used identification method when combining 
different databases. However, it is not completely flawless either. Luckily, the identification 
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issues are relatively well studied among US companies. For example, Chan et al. (1995) report 
that there would not seem to be significant selection biases related to matching data with 
CUSIP identification code between the two databases. Every linking method always carries a 
risk of some errors, but the effect of these errors can be considered minimal in this study due 
to the large sample size and long observation period. 
In the second phase of this study, the two previous databases (Compustat and CRSP) are 
linked to the third database, IBES. The CUSIP identification code is used in this linkage as 
well. Every time a new database is linked to the previous ones, some companies are left out of 
the sample because of mismatch in CUSIP codes. However, the analysts themselves create a
much more significant bias in this particular linkage. Naturally, large established companies
are followed by the analysts more often than smaller ones. This inevitable bias is much 
stronger than any bias related to the differences in the identification codes. Thus, in analyzing 
the results in this phase, we must stay alert for possibly biased sample in terms of company 
size. 
3.2.5 Length of the buy-and-hold period and forecast horizon
In this study the buy-and-hold period is chosen to be one year. The forecast horizon, i.e. the 
length of perfect foresight or analyst forecasts is chosen to match the buy-and-hold period. If 
the foresight period would differ from the buy-and-hold period, it would create awkward 
situations especially when considering perfect foresight. For example, consider a two year 
perfect foresight period and a one year buy-and-hold period. If the actualized earnings in two 
years would be significantly lower than reflected in the stock price at the moment the holding 
period starts, there are no guarantees that the mispricing will be revealed when one year has 
passed and the value driver performance is evaluated. Instead, the mispricing could become 
even higher before the actualized earnings are published the next year. In this case the 
performance of the value driver incorporating the actualized earnings in two years could be 
very low even though the value driver would have got the recommendation right when 
considering the full forecast horizon. Thus, the forecast and the holding period should match 
in order to get reliable results.
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The buy-and-hold period is set to one year, because yearly returns are widely used in practice 
as well. Moreover, increasing the length of the forecast period also decreases the accuracy of 
the analyst forecasts used in the second phase of this study. In addition, the data amount 
available in the IBES database decreases as the forecast period increases. Therefore, a holding 
period of one year also fits the available data well. Shorter holding periods than one year are 
also problematic. First of all, there is little sense in using monthly level data as the minimum 
publication frequency of the fundamental data is one quarter. In the perfect foresight method 
the fundamental value drivers would remain the same and the portfolios would just be shuffled 
according to the changes in the stock prices. This would merely add noise in the data, and if 
implemented in practice, it would also make transaction fees significantly higher. Also the 
quarterly holding period is problematic, because the four month publication quarantines
related to the quarterly financial statements would heavily overlap with the next quarter. In 
addition, the different fiscal-years of companies would have to be calculated separately which 
would decrease the sample size dramatically. Consequently, the one year buy-and-hold period 
associated with one year forecasting period is clearly the best option for this study.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
In this section the data sample is introduced and the basic statistical characteristics are 
presented. First, the possible selection biases caused by technicalities related to database issues
are considered together with average stock returns. Secondly, the distribution of the market 
capitalization in the sample is carefully examined so that the size-effect can be separated in the 
following phases of this study.
3.3.1 Average returns and number of stocks in the sample
The average returns and the number of companies in the sample are listed on a yearly basis in 
Table 3.  The respective return of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index is also reported for the 
same years. The different database combinations are reported separately as the data sample is 
affected by the availability of the analyst data. In the first set, the number of companies is 
reported for the Compustat and CRSP combination, which is used for calculating the 
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backward-looking value drivers and forward-looking value drivers using perfect foresight. As 
we can see, the average returns are significantly higher than the respective returns on S&P 500 
index. This phenomenon is due to the dominance of small stocks in the sample. In calculating 
the average each stock is equally weighted and as we saw in section 2.1.1, the small stocks 
tend to provide higher returns than large stocks. This matter is further discussed in the next 
section. 
The second set describes the number of stocks that have one year EPS forecast available in 
IBES database. As mentioned earlier, this data is available only from 1984 onwards. We can 
see that the number of companies in the sample decreases significantly, but the main reason is 
that there are no EPS estimates available for the smallest companies. This effect is also 
discussed in more detail in the next section. Finally, the last set documents the number of 
stocks that have stock recommendations available in the IBES database. The availability of 
this data starts from year 1994. As we can see, the availability of recommendations increases 
over time and in the last couple of years almost all companies having EPS forecast have also 
recommendations.
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Table 3 Number of companies and average stock returns in the sample
Year
No of 
stocks
Average 
return
No of 
stocks
Average 
return
No of 
stocks
Average 
return S&P 500 index return
1975 2002 52.6% 23.3%
1976 1951 15.4% -4.2%
1977 2096 23.7% -9.4%
1978 2075 31.6% 13.9%
1979 2052 9.4% 0.5%
1980 2004 69.1% 33.2%
1981 2029 -8.0% -17.7%
1982 2081 74.3% 36.6%
1983 2149 10.6% 4.1%
1984 2325 15.2% 1510 15.2% 13.5%
1985 2375 32.4% 1564 33.2% 32.2%
1986 2408 20.7% 1569 19.3% 22.1%
1987 2533 -7.6% 1696 -8.3% -11.2%
1988 2619 16.8% 1703 15.2% 13.9%
1989 2602 12.3% 1761 11.6% 15.3%
1990 2583 15.2% 1771 14.1% 10.4%
1991 2678 30.8% 1817 22.2% 7.6%
1992 2896 15.9% 1973 13.7% 11.9%
1993 3121 16.4% 2198 10.8% -1.3%
1994 3455 11.4% 2463 10.0% 1893 10.5% 12.3%
1995 3606 37.0% 2633 34.8% 2121 35.1% 28.9%
1996 3819 12.2% 2859 9.0% 2385 8.3% 17.3%
1997 4125 44.2% 3181 44.4% 2755 43.9% 45.5%
1998 4181 -7.7% 3254 -7.9% 2919 -7.9% 16.8%
1999 4002 87.8% 3109 77.8% 2824 81.4% 16.5%
2000 4009 -11.4% 3081 -10.6% 2812 -10.7% -22.6%
2001 3942 30.3% 2917 26.7% 2693 26.7% -1.1%
2002 3818 -20.4% 2690 -24.5% 2498 -24.9% -26.1%
2003 3776 112.1% 2675 97.8% 2498 94.6% 32.8%
2004 3768 10.7% 2748 7.9% 2580 7.5% 4.8%
2005 3822 30.0% 2900 28.8% 2772 28.7% 9.7%
2006 3868 11.0% 2977 9.3% 2876 9.1% 9.7%
2007 3918 -11.4% 3030 -11.5% 2967 -11.7% -6.9%
The table includes the number of stocks and average returns in the sample with different database
combinations.The first column states the basic sample of this study where the Compustat fundamentals
database is linked to the CRSP stock price database. The next column describes the situation after combining
the IBES 1 year consensus EPS forecasts with the previous databases. The third column describes the last
database combination where the consensus analyst recommendations are included as well. As we can see, the
EPS data on IBES database is available from 1984 and the recommendations from 1994. All the columns
include also average stock return of these samples for a buy-and-hold period starting from April 1st and ending
on March 31st the next year. Finally the last column includes the S&P 500 composite return for the same buy-
and-hold period.
Compustat & CRSP IBES EPS forecast
IBES 
recommendations S&P 500 index return
3.3.2 Market capitalization
The size of the company has been showed to affect the stock market returns in many other 
studies (see e.g. Banz, 1981 and Fama and French, 1992). The small companies are a 
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significant part of the sample in this study as well. In Table 4 the stocks in the sample in year 
2005 have been categorized by their size according to the same categorization used by Fama 
and French (2008). As we can see, the micro- and small-caps have much smaller market 
capitalization than the large-caps and they form a significant proportion of all companies in 
the sample. Because the stock market returns are calculated as equal-weighted average, the 
small stocks have a strong effect on the average stock returns. The negative side of the small 
stock dominance is that value drivers that act as proxies for the size seem to perform better 
than they would if there were less small companies in the sample. In addition, any practical 
attempts to follow the investment strategies suggested in this study might be impossible 
because of liquidity constraints on small stocks. In particular, shorting very small stocks is 
often impossible.
On the other hand, using the market-weighted returns would emphasize the large-caps
extremely heavily (Fama and French, 2008). The disadvantages of this approach would be 
even more devastating. Individual mega-caps would have a dominating effect over all the 
small companies combined. Thus, a single company specific issue could affect the value 
driver performance significantly in a given year. Another way to decrease the size effect 
would be to omit smaller companies from the sample or run the analyses separately for 
different company sizes. This approach would cut the sample size dramatically as we see in 
Table 4. By omitting all companies with significantly lower market-caps than the average, we 
would end up omitting a greater part of the sample. Therefore, the sample is analyzed as a 
whole in order to maximize the sample size. This is particularly important for value drivers 
that impose strict data requirements themselves, such as the PEG ratio. As a conclusion, the 
equal-weight method without any size omissions or categorizations is chosen despite the 
dominance of small companies in the sample. However, the size effect is closely monitored 
throughout the study, and whenever needed sensitivity analysis is performed to separate the 
size effect from the performance of the value driver.
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Table 4 Distribution of market capitalization in the sample in year 2005
Size category Percentile No of Stocks Limits (m$) Average Size
Micro-caps 0-20% 764 0 - 87 41.8
Small-caps 20-50% 1147 87 - 406 212.2
Large-caps 50-100% 1911 406- 6070.8
All 3822 3109.0
Companies in the sample (Compustat+CRSP) separated by their market capitalization in year 
2005. The percentile limits adopted from Fama and French (2008.)
Table 5 further clarifies the effect of the market capitalization on the stock returns. The 
companies are sorted according to their market capitalization into five portfolios. In Panel A 
all companies are included in the sample, and the smallest companies in the buy portfolio 
produce 26% higher stock market returns than the largest companies in the sell portfolio. The 
smaller stocks experience a higher likelihood of extreme returns as well, because the average 
return of the buy portfolio is much higher than the respective median return. In other words, 
the high extreme returns can be found in the smallest companies. In Panel B the micro-caps 
are omitted from the sample. The omission is done by removing the bottom 20th percentile in 
terms of market capitalization each year. We can see that the size effect halves after the 
omission. The hedge return between the buy and sell portfolio is only 12% anymore. In Panel 
C the micro- and small-caps are both omitted. This is conducted by removing the bottom 50th
percentile in terms of market capitalization from the sample. Again the size effect almost 
halves and now the effect calculated using median returns is almost non-existent. Naturally, 
the sample size is also halved. As a conclusion, in the following analyses the examination is 
started by using the full sample in determining the value driver performance. If the size 
distribution in the portfolios seems uneven, the size effect is diminished by omitting the 
micro-caps from the sample. The decrease in the size effect after omitting the next 30 % of 
stock is not significant enough when considering the respective decrease in the sample size.
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Table 5 The portfolio returns after sorting the stocks by their market capitalization 1975-2007
Sell Reduce Hold Accumul. Buy All N Buy vs. Sell
Panel A: All stocks included
Average return 16% 19% 22% 27% 42% 25% 2930 26%
Median return 12% 13% 13% 14% 19% 6%
Average size (m$) 5552 425 143 53 15 1238
Panel B: Micro-caps omitted (below 20th percentile)
Average return 16% 18% 21% 23% 28% 21% 2343 12%
Median return 12% 13% 13% 12% 14% 2%
Average size (m$) 6717 617 234 105 48 1544
Panel C: Micro- and small-caps omitted (below 50th percentile)
Average return 15% 17% 18% 20% 22% 18% 1464 7%
Median return 12% 13% 13% 13% 13% 1%
Average size (m$) 9867 1245 551 300 177 2428
Each year the stocks are assigned into 5 portfolios each consisting of the same amount of stocks. The assigning is 
done by sorting the stocks according to their market capitalization. The stocks with the lowest market capitalization 
are included in the buy portfolio and vice versa. From each year the average and median returns of every portfolio are 
calculated. The averages or medians are averaged over all the years in the sample (1975-2007). Also the average 
market capitalization (size) of the stocks in each portofolio is reported. N is the average number of stocks in the 
sample. 
The size effect is not an issue when dealing with analyst forecasts and recommendations. As 
mentioned in section 3.2.4, there is a natural selection bias towards bigger companies when 
using analyst data, because analysts tend to follow only large established companies. 
Therefore, the micro-cap omission is not needed when using analyst data. Table 6 describes 
the distribution of market capitalization with analyst data using the same absolute size 
categories as Table 4. As we can see, the number of micro-caps followed by analysts is 
significantly lower than in the full sample. Only 7% of companies followed by the analyst fall 
into this category (compared to 20% in the full sample). The effect can be seen in the average 
market capitalization as well, which is up to $800 million higher in the analyst sub-sample. All 
in all, the micro-cap omission is not needed when using the analyst data because of the analyst 
selection bias towards larger companies.
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Table 6 Distribution of market capitalization in the analyst data subsample in year 2005
Size category Limits (m$) No of Stocks % of Sample Average Size
Micro-caps 0 - 87 215 7% 55.4
Small-caps 87 - 406 887 31% 222.9
Large-caps 406- 1798 62% 6174.9
All 2900 3426.4 3909.7
Companies in the sample (Compustat+CRSP+IBES) separated by their market capitalization 
in year 2005. Same category limits as in Table 4. 
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4 VALUE DRIVER PERFORMANCE USING BACKWARD-LOOKING DATA 
AND PERFECT FORESIGHT
In this chapter the sorting method is used to test value drivers using historical figures and 
perfect foresight. The value drivers are first calculated using only historical items. In this 
setting the analyses are close to the classic anomaly studies. The purpose of this examination 
is to provide us the lower limit on the returns that should be expected later in the study. If one 
is able to gain higher returns using historical rather than forward-looking data, there is no 
sense in trying to forecast the future fundamentals. Next the same value drivers are calculated 
using the future financial figures, i.e. taking advantage of the perfect foresight. This analysis 
provides us an upper limit that anyone could ever achieve by forecasting future fundamentals. 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the upper and lower limit of returns achievable
using the tested value drivers in practice and to find out which value drivers would work best 
if forecasts were unbiased and accurate. In the second phase of this study, these limits are
compared against the performance of the analyst forecasts. 
4.1 Performance of backward-looking value drivers
In this section the value driver performance is tested using only historical items, i.e. the perfect 
foresight is not yet applied. The historical value drivers are calculated based on fiscal year-end 
financial statements for year Y-1 (dated at the latest December 31st). The value driver 
performance is determined by one year buy-and-hold returns starting from April 1st in year Y 
and ending on March 31st in year Y+1. The four month slack between the financial statements 
date and starting the holding period is due to the delay related to publishing the financial 
statements as mentioned in section 3.1.2. The exact formulas used in calculating the value 
drivers are presented in Appendix 1.
4.1.1 Backward-looking value driver performance using full sample
First, the backward-looking value drivers are tested with all the companies in the sample. The 
results are shown in Table 7. For each value driver the average return over the full 
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examination period (1975-2007) is reported individually for each portfolio. From these figures
we can examine how large difference there is between the buy and sell portfolio returns and 
whether the portfolios in between behave coherently. The difference between the buy and sell 
portfolios, i.e. the hedge return, is reported in the ‘Buy vs. Sell’ column. The next row is the 
respective median returns. In many cases the median returns provide better results than 
average returns, because extreme stock returns have less influence in the median calculation 
method. 
The average market capitalization is reported in the third row. This can be used to examine 
whether any portfolio is dominated by smaller or larger companies. As mentioned earlier, 
smaller companies tend to provide higher returns. Therefore, whenever needed the size effect 
is separated from the value driver performance by omitting micro-caps (bottom 20th percentile 
in terms of market capitalization) from the sample. These results are shown in Table 8 in 
section 4.1.2. 
The fourth row includes the average values of the value driver under review for each portfolio. 
These values can be used to check how much the portfolios differ from each other in terms of 
the value driver used in creating them. Extremely large or low values in the buy and sell 
portfolio indicate that additional analysis omitting extreme value driver values could be in 
order. These sensitivity analyses are performed in section 4.1.3. 
Finally, the last row of the results reports the buy vs. sell diagnostics. The first measure “% of 
Max” compares the current hedge return against the highest hedge return ever possible in the 
same sample as explained in section 3.1.3. However, this measure is mainly used in the 
context of perfect foresight, because when using historical fundamentals, the percentages 
remain quite low as there is no knowledge of the future used in generating the value drivers. 
The two last figures reported in the table are related to the t-test conducted to test statistically
the difference between the buy and sell portfolio return. Here the returns from all years are 
combined together using the yearly average returns as describe in section 3.1.3. The 
significance level of rejecting the null hypothesis (no difference in portfolio returns) is 
reported together with the actual t-stat value. Also the alternative hedge return, i.e. the 
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difference in portfolio returns using the combined yearly data, is reported here. The reporting 
format of the value driver performance remains the same throughout the study.
Table 7 Backward-looking value driver performance using full sample
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/B
Average Return 18% 20% 22% 26% 31% 24% 13.1% 2923
Median Return 7% 10% 13% 15% 18% 11.5%
Average Size 2829 1824 1149 767 422 1398 -570%
Average P/B 14.36 2.65 1.71 1.17 0.62 4.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
8.8% 16.45*** 13.8%
P/E
Average Return 19% 19% 20% 23% 28% 22% 8.5% 2292
Median Return 7% 11% 13% 16% 18% 11.1%
Average Size 2013 2364 1986 1476 967 1761 -108%
Average P/E 163.33 21.62 14.91 10.97 5.73 43.32
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
6.6% 8.6*** 7.3%
PEG
Average Return 17% 19% 21% 23% 25% 21% 7.5% 1386
Median Return 11% 14% 14% 14% 15% 3.8%
Average Size 3920 2660 1673 1500 875 2126 -348%
Average PEG 8.91 0.83 0.43 0.20 0.05 2.08
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
6.1% 7.91*** 6.6%
Value Driver
(Table 7 continues)
Backward-looking value driver performance in 1975-2007. The value driver is calculated for every stock separately
using historical fundamental data dated at the latest December 31st the previous year (Y-1) for all years in the
sample. Each year the stocks are sorted according to the value driver and assigned to the five equally sized
portfolios. The buy portfolio consists of the best 20% of stocks ranked by the value driver and vice versa. The
portfolio returns are calculated by using a one year buy-and-hold period starting on April 1st (Y = 0) and ending on
March 31st (Y+1) taking the average or median of the returns of all the stocks in the portfolio. Finally, the portfolio
returns from different years are combined by averaging them. Also the average market capitalization (size) is
reported for all portfolios. The buy vs. sell (hedge) return is calculated as the difference between the buy and sell
portfolio returns. The item "% of max" is the proportion of the value driver hedge return from the largest possible
hedge return achievable by sorting the stocks according to their stock returns directly. The t-stat is the t-value of the t-
test testing the statistical significance of the difference in buy and sell portfolio returns (10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels marked with *). The difference in averages is an alternative way to calculate the hedge return used in the t-test.
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Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/RI1
Average Return 19% 19% 20% 23% 28% 22% 9.0% 1770
Median Return 9% 12% 14% 16% 18% 8.9%
Average Size 1925 2909 2615 1868 1182 2100 -63%
Average P/RI 385.18 40.82 26.22 18.19 8.97 95.88
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
7.0% 8.24*** 7.4%
D/E
Average Return 23% 22% 24% 22% 28% 24% 4.8% 2965
Median Return 13% 14% 13% 8% 13% -0.9%
Average Size 1439 1894 1871 1063 696 1393 -107%
Average D/E 6.16 0.62 0.29 0.09 0.01 1.44
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
3.2% 4.79*** 3.9%
Growth
Average Return 23% 21% 20% 19% 22% 21% -0.6% 2033
Median Return 12% 14% 14% 13% 12% 0.1%
Average Size 1322 1931 2916 2252 1184 1921 -12%
Average Growth -0.61 -0.29 -0.14 0.06 5.01 0.81
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-0.5% -0.59 -0.5%
ROE
Average Return 30% 24% 22% 21% 22% 24% -7.6% 2905
Median Return 10% 13% 14% 14% 12% 2.6%
Average Size 358 698 1219 1839 2935 1410 88%
Average ROE -0.90 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.70 0.03
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-5.1% -9.06*** -9.3%
1 RI is estimated as EBIT*1-0.35) - Invested Capital * 0.07.
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1% 
Value Driver
(Table 7 continues)
The best value driver when using only historical value drivers seems to be the P/B ratio, which 
is in line with the results of the anomaly literature discussed in section 2.1.1. The hedge return
is up to 13.1%, which is considerable especially when taking account that no forward-looking 
fundamentals were used here. All the five portfolios act very coherently. The average return 
increases gradually as we move on from the sell portfolio towards the buy portfolio. The 
median returns are somewhat lower than the average returns, but the overall effect is very 
similar to using average. The median as the calculation method still results in coherent 
portfolios and a hedge return of 11.5%. The statistical significance of the hedge return is very 
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clear with all common significance levels. As we can see, however, the size is heavily 
correlated with the portfolios. It seems that the P/B ratio works also as a proxy for the market 
capitalization. The low P/B companies tend to be significantly smaller than the companies 
with a high P/B ratio. The average size in the sell portfolio is up to eight times larger than in 
the buy portfolio. Probably a large part of the performance of the P/B ratio is related to its 
proxy as size. Therefore, the results are rerun in section 4.1.2 after omitting the micro-caps 
from the sample. 
The P/E ratio is the second best backward-looking value driver tested in this study. 
Calculation of the ratio requires positive net earnings, and thus the number of companies in the 
sample is somewhat lower, 2,292 on average. However, exactly as the value vs. growth 
anomaly suggests the driver is able to create an 8.5% hedge return. The lower tail of the 
portfolio returns remains relatively flat, but otherwise the portfolios are coherent. The median 
portfolio returns lead to even higher hedge return of 11.1%, which is already very close to the 
performance of the P/B ratio. The extreme returns are offsetting the portfolio returns in this 
case. The difference in the portfolio returns is statistically significant. The sell portfolio has 
over twice as large companies as the buy portfolio, but the size does not follow the P/E ratio 
linearly. The highest market capitalization is in the reduce portfolio. By all standards the size 
effect is not as strong with the P/E ratio as with the P/B ratio. Still the performance of the P/E 
ratio is tested without micro-caps in section 4.1.2. 
The PEG ratio incorporates the growth aspect into the P/E ratio. Theoretically speaking this 
value driver could be able to identify potential high P/E stocks that would still have 
investment value through high growth opportunities. The value driver is calculated by dividing 
the P/E ratio with earnings growth percentage. The PEG ratio is able to generate a 7.5% hedge
return, but the return remains slightly below the hedge return of the plain P/E ratio. In terms of 
median return the value driver underperforms the P/E ratio even more clearly. The 
disadvantage of this value driver is that it decreases the sample size significantly. In addition 
to requiring positive earnings the value driver requires also positive earnings growth. This cuts 
the average number of companies in the sample down to 1,386. The hedge return is still 
statistically significant despite the smaller sample. The size is a considerable part of this value 
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driver as well. Although there is hardly room to decrease the sample size by omitting micro-
caps, this is still done in section 4.1.2. 
The price-to-residual income (P/RI) ratio performs surprisingly well despite the rough 
approximations used in calculating it. The exact calculation methods are explained in 
Appendix 1, but in short the residual income is estimated by deducting  a 7% cost of capital 
from the operating profit. The cost of capital is calculated from invested capital and the tax 
rate is assumed to be 35%. The P/RI ratio can be considered as a more sophisticated P/E ratio 
that takes into account also the cost of capital. The idea is to include only earnings that really 
increase shareholder value. The advantage of this value driver is its strong link to valuation 
theory. Indeed, after these heavy approximations the P/RI ratio is still able to create a 9% 
hedge return just above the normal P/E ratio. The median hedge return is slightly below the 
respective return of the P/E ratio. All in all, the P/RI shows clear potential as a backward-
looking value driver, but would require much more sophisticated estimation methods.
Return on equity (ROE) behaves oddly as a value driver. Using the ROE calculated from 
historical fundamentals leads to negative hedge return. Counterintuitively, the previously more 
profitable companies lead to lower stock market returns the next year. This is also 
controversial to some other studies made on profitability (see e.g. Haugen and Baker, 1996). 
The most likely reason for this phenomenon is the apparent correlation with ROE and size. 
Small companies seem to have smaller ROE percentages, which allocates them to the sell 
portfolio using this value driver. Despite the low ROE percentage, these smaller companies 
seem to outperform larger ones so significantly that the overall results get reversed. The 
extreme returns play a significant role here as well. Using the median in calculating portfolio 
returns actually results in a positive buy vs. sell return. Even when using the median, the 
portfolios do not behave coherently and the value driver does not seem to explain future stock 
returns very well. The value driver is thoroughly tested in the following sections with 
sensitivity analysis in order to understand why the value driver creates negative returns. 
Also plain earnings growth (marked Growth in Table 7) is tested as a value driver. In the 
context of previous studies this value driver seems controversial. On the one hand, growth as 
such is usually a sign of a successful company. On the other hand, the anomaly studies found 
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that high growth companies tend to be overpriced on the markets. The value companies 
provided significantly higher stock returns in the long-run. In this study, historical earnings 
growth shows no potential as a backward-looking value driver, because the value driver does 
not create any kind of buy vs. sell returns in one way or another. The difference between buy 
and sell portfolio is statistically insignificant with all common significance levels. The returns 
are oddly distributed, because the highest average returns are with the buy and the sell 
portfolios, but the highest median return is with the hold portfolio. Also the size peaks at the 
hold portfolio, and therefore, the value driver is tested also after omitting the micro-caps.
The D/E ratio creates a small positive hedge return in this sample, but the level of performance 
is significantly below the P/B or P/E ratios. This is in line with the previous studies as 
mentioned in section 2.3. However, the value driver has difficulties in creating any kind of 
difference between the median returns. All in all, the value driver shows relatively low 
performance as backward-looking value driver and its capability of capturing forward-looking 
information is very weak as well. Therefore, it is excluded from the following phases of the 
study.
4.1.2 Backward-looking value driver performance after omitting the micro-caps
In this section the same analysis is repeated after omitting the micro-caps, i.e. the lowest 20th
percentile in terms of market capitalization, from the sample. As we saw in the previous 
section, all the value drivers were more or less correlated with the size. Therefore, all value 
drivers are recalculated after omitting the micro-caps. The results are shown in Table 8.
Naturally, the sample sizes in all value drivers decrease by 20% after the operation. However, 
the sample size of all value drivers remains at a sufficient level for statistically significant 
results.
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Table 8 Backward-looking value driver performance after omitting the micro-caps 
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/B
Average Return 17% 17% 20% 21% 24% 20% 6.9% 2338
Median Return 7% 10% 12% 14% 16% 9.5%
Average Size 3258 2183 1484 1067 728 1744 -347%
Average P/B 16.29 2.87 1.88 1.31 0.73 4.62
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.3% 8.99*** 6.9%
P/E
Average Return 17% 17% 18% 20% 23% 19% 6.7% 1866
Median Return 7% 11% 13% 15% 18% 10.6%
Average Size 2293 2823 2395 1797 1320 2126 -74%
Average P/E 156.06 22.05 15.39 11.51 6.42 42.28
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.8% 6.26*** 4.9%
PEG
Average Return 16% 18% 19% 19% 21% 19% 5.3% 1108
Median Return 11% 14% 14% 13% 15% 3.6%
Average Size 4586 3241 2093 1908 1432 2652 -220%
Average PEG 9.74 0.91 0.49 0.24 0.07 2.29
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
4.8% 5.7*** 4.7%
P/RI1
Average Return 17% 17% 18% 20% 23% 19% 6.5% 1440
Median Return 8% 11% 13% 16% 17% 8.5%
Average Size 2204 3452 3034 2365 1612 2533 -37%
Average P/RI 361.87 41.64 27.20 19.28 10.17 92.03
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.7% 5.4*** 4.8%
ROE
Average Return 21% 20% 20% 19% 20% 20% -0.4% 2323
Median Return 7% 12% 14% 13% 12% 5.4%
Average Size 574 1071 1562 2287 3300 1759 83%
Average ROE -0.80 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.73 0.06
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-0.3% -1.72* -1.6%
Similar calculation methods as in Table 7, but now the bottom 20th percentile of smallest stocks in terms of market 
capitalization (micro-caps) have been omitted from the sample. 
Value Driver
1 RI is estimated as (EBIT*1-0.35) - Invested Capital * 0.07.
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1% 
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The most dramatic effect after omitting the micro-caps is the decrease in the performance of 
the P/B ratio. The P/B ratio was the most heavily size-correlated value driver. Thus, its 
performance almost halves after omitting the micro-caps. This is logical after considering the 
high returns related to micro-caps shown in section 3.3.2.  The hedge return decreases to 6.9%, 
but still remains statistically significant. The hedge margin calculated using median does not 
fall as much as the average hedge margin, which implies that the micro-caps also included 
stocks that distorted the results through extreme stock returns. The P/B ratio still remains 
correlated with market capitalization even after omitting the micro-stocks. However, as we 
saw in section 3.3.2 omitting the micro-caps is enough to eliminate most of the size effect. To 
validate this the performance of the P/B ratio is calculated omitting bottom 50th percentile, and 
the results are reported in Table 9. The average hedge return drops only an additional 2% and 
the median hedge return stays almost the same. Indeed, the micro-cap omission seems to be 
enough to eliminate most of the size effect. As a conclusion, the P/B ratio seems to be 
relatively good backward-looking value driver even without the size effect.
Table 9 Performance of the backward-looking P/B ratio after omitting micro- and small-caps
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/B
Average Return 15% 14% 17% 18% 20% 17% 4.7% 1574
Median Return 8% 10% 12% 13% 16% 8.1%
Average Size 4364 3185 2110 1680 1305 2529 -234%
Average P/B 12.79 3.13 2.06 1.43 0.83 4.05
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
4.2% 3.96*** 3.5%
Value Driver
Similar calculation methods as in Table 7, but now the bottom 50th percentile of smallest stocks in terms of market 
capitalization (micro-caps) have been omitted from the sample. 
The P/E ratio does not suffer from the size-effect as much as the P/B ratio, which can be seen 
in Table 8. After omitting the micro-caps the performance of the P/B and P/E ratio are very 
close to each other. Actually in terms of median hedge return the P/E ratio is already better 
backward-looking value driver. ROE is the last value driver, where significant changes can be 
seen after omitting the micro-caps. When using the full sample this value driver produced 
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significant negative hedge returns. After omitting the micro-caps the average hedge return is 
practically zero. This indicates that the negative hedge return was mostly due to the strong 
size-effect in the driver. The larger companies tended to have higher ROE values than the 
smaller companies. As a conclusion, however, ROE shows no potential as a backward-looking 
value driver, because it is incapable of creating a statistically significant hedge return.
The changes in the performance of the other value drivers after omitting the micro-caps are 
smaller. These were also moderately correlated with market capitalization and therefore their 
performance slightly decreases as the micro-caps are omitted. The changes are, however,
relatively small. The pecking order of the rest of the value drivers remains the same after 
omitting the micro-caps.
4.1.3 Backward-looking value driver performance after omitting extreme observations
The last sensitivity analysis conducted for the backward-looking value drivers is the omission 
of extreme value driver observations. For most value drivers the data is already somewhat 
filtered for extreme values, because the value drivers have strict restrictions on how they must 
be calculated. For example, the P/E ratio requires positive earnings and the P/B ratio requires 
positive book value. In addition, any database related errors to negative prices are already 
omitted. However, the value drivers can still get abnormally high or low values. In some cases
these values could be due to one-off situations or database errors, and there could be a risk that 
these would distort the overall results. 
Thus, the results are rerun after omitting 1% of the highest and the lowest value driver 
observations. This method is quite rough for the buy vs. sell return, because it directly affects 
the composition of the buy and the sell portfolio. However, it also reveals if the overall results 
are heavily affected by extreme value driver values. The extreme observation omission is 
conducted for the data sample where the micro-caps are already omitted. In other words, these 
results represent as clean a sample as possible. The results are shown in Table 10.
- 46 -
Table 10 Backward-looking value driver performance after omitting micro-caps and extreme value driver 
observations
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/B
Average Return 16% 18% 20% 21% 24% 20% 7.1% 2290
Median Return 7% 10% 12% 14% 16% 9.1%
Average Size 3319 2157 1491 1073 755 1759 -339%
Average P/B 6.83 2.84 1.88 1.32 0.78 2.73
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.5% 9.66*** 7.4%
P/E
Average Return 16% 17% 18% 20% 24% 19% 7.0% 1831
Median Return 7% 11% 12% 15% 18% 10.8%
Average Size 2352 2848 2361 1798 1375 2147 -71%
Average P/E 71.00 21.85 15.40 11.58 6.82 25.33
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
6.1% 6.71*** 5.3%
PEG
Average Return 16% 18% 19% 19% 21% 19% 5.3% 1087
Median Return 11% 14% 14% 13% 14% 3.5%
Average Size 4662 3209 2085 1894 1485 2667 -214%
Average PEG 4.02 0.90 0.49 0.24 0.07 1.15
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
4.8% 5.33*** 4.7%
P/RI1
Average Return 17% 17% 18% 21% 23% 19% 6.5% 1412
Median Return 8% 11% 13% 16% 17% 8.5%
Average Size 2252 3416 3057 2388 1663 2555 -35%
Average P/RI 175.42 41.20 27.21 19.42 10.82 54.82
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.7% 5.23*** 4.8%
ROE
Average Return 21% 20% 20% 19% 20% 20% -0.4% 2276
Median Return 7% 12% 14% 13% 13% 5.2%
Average Size 601 1083 1558 2253 3410 1781 82%
Average ROE -0.26 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.39 0.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-0.3% -1.46*** -1.4%
Similar calculation methods as in Table 7, but now the bottom 20th percentile of smallest stocks in terms of market 
capitalization (micro-caps) and 1% of the highest and the lowest value driver values have been omitted from the 
sample. 
Value Driver
1 RI is estimated as EBIT*(1-0.35) - Invested Capital * 0.07.
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1% 
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The effect of the extreme observations on the value driver performance seems to be relatively 
small. After omitting 1% of the highest and lowest value driver values the hedge margins 
remain more or less the same as in Table 8 where only micro-caps were omitted. Naturally, the 
extreme observation omission affects most the buy and sell portfolio where the omissions 
were made, but even in these the changes are only minimal. The biggest changes can be seen 
in the average values of the value drivers in each portfolio. As expected, the average value 
drivers are significantly closer to each other after omitting the extreme observations. 
Consequently, it seems that stocks with extreme value driver observations do not mean
extreme stock returns. 
There is one more sensitivity analysis that can be done for the value driver performance. The 
importance of extreme stock returns in anomaly studies has been widely discussed. 
Researchers have shown that classic anomaly studies are very dependent for small number of 
extreme stock returns (see e.g. Knez and Ready, 1997). These studies have been conducted by 
omitting extreme stock returns (e.g. 1% of the highest and lowest stock returns) from the 
sample altogether. In this study, the effect of the extreme stock returns is mostly studied by 
looking at the median returns of the portfolio returns. This diminishes significantly the effect 
of the extreme stock returns. The median approach is better also in the sense that it can be 
easily applied in practice as well. If the dominance of extreme stock returns needs to be 
eliminated, the reporting can be based on median returns. Omitting the extreme stock returns 
has a direct effect on the buy vs. sell returns, because it by definition omits any extreme stock 
returns that have a significant effect on the results. In Table 11 we can see the P/B and P/E 
ratio after omitting the extreme stock returns in addition to the previous omissions of micro-
caps and extreme value driver observations. 
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Table 11 Backward-looking value driver performance after omitting micro-caps, extreme value driver 
observations and extreme stock returns
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/B
Average Return 15% 15% 18% 19% 22% 18% 6.6% 2243
Median Return 7% 10% 12% 14% 16% 8.7%
Average Size 3408 2190 1487 1084 764 1787 -346%
Average P/B 6.74 2.82 1.87 1.31 0.78 2.70
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.7% 10.45*** 6.5%
P/E
Average Return 14% 16% 17% 19% 22% 18% 7.8% 1797
Median Return 7% 11% 13% 15% 18% 10.5%
Average Size 2403 2900 2371 1808 1391 2175 -73%
Average P/E 70.15 21.70 15.35 11.57 6.82 25.12
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
7.4% 9.91*** 6.2%
Similar calculation methods as in Table 10, but now in addition to micro-caps and extreme value driver observations 
also extreme stock returns are omitted from the sample.  
Value Driver
As we can see, now the average portfolio returns are changed by few percentage points 
towards the median returns. Still the buy vs. sell returns remain relatively stable. It is 
interesting that after omitting the extreme stock returns the P/E ratio actually seems to perform 
better than the P/B ratio. However, the extreme stock return omission can be considered as 
questionable sensitivity tool as it uses hindsight over future stock returns in omitting the 
stocks. In the following phases of this study, the effect of the extreme stock returns is 
examined only through median returns.
4.1.4 Conclusions on the performance of backward-looking value drivers
The purpose of examining the value drivers using only historical fundamentals was to create a 
certain lower limit for the results in the next stages. We saw that one can achieve 7-13% hedge
returns just by using backward-looking value drivers. In the next stages, this level of buy vs. 
sell return can be considered as the lower limit that the value driver has to exceed. Otherwise it 
would be better for the investor to skip forecasting and just use easily available historical 
fundamentals in creating the portfolios. 
- 49 -
The best backward-looking value driver was the P/B ratio. However, the P/B ratio had also the 
strongest link with the market capitalization. As we saw in Table 8 significant part of the 
hedge return was actually due to the size-effect. As such this is not a problem since we are 
only looking for value drivers that are able to create high hedge returns, but in the next phase 
when perfect foresight is applied the situation will become more complicated. Then there are 
two powerful forces possibly affecting the results: the size effect and the new knowledge not 
yet incorporated in the stock price.
The second best backward-looking value driver was the P/E ratio. It suffered also from the 
size effect, but significantly less than the P/B ratio. Interestingly, the more the sample was 
cleaned from possible biases the more the P/E ratio improved its performance compared to the 
P/B ratio. In the following phases when the value drivers are turned into forward-looking, the 
P/E ratio offers the best capabilities of incorporating future expectations into the value driver. 
There were also other value drivers that showed clear potential. First, the PEG ratio resulted in 
statistically significant hedge return, but it was still outperformed by the ordinary P/E ratio. 
The difference between the value drivers, however, was very small and thus, the PEG will be 
tested in the following phases as well. Perhaps the most interesting finding was the strong 
performance of P/RI ratio despite the rough approximations made in calculating it. When 
using the full sample it actually outperformed the P/E ratio by a small margin. The value 
driver shows good potential but it would certainly require more sophisticated calculation 
methods. 
Finally, earnings growth and ROE showed no real potential for backward-looking value 
drivers. These value drivers contain good forward-looking characteristics and therefore they 
will be tested in under perfect foresight as well. The D/E ratio showed only moderate 
performance as backward-looking value driver and its capability of incorporating future 
forecasts is so low that it will be excluded in the following phases of this study.
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4.2 Performance of forward-looking value drivers using perfect foresight
In this section the analysis is taken further by using future fundamentals in calculating the 
value drivers. This examination should provide us with the upper limit for the buy vs. sell 
return that one could ever achieve by utilizing the tested value drivers. The methodology is 
similar to the previous section. However, now the measure “% of Max”, i.e. the value driver’s 
capability of capturing as large proportion of the maximum hedge return as possible, is used as 
the primary decision criterion. 
4.2.1 Forward-looking value driver performance using full sample
Similarly to the previous section, the analysis starts by examining the results using the full 
sample. These results are presented in Table 12. Later the micro-caps and the extreme value 
driver observations are excluded in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. The exact formulas used in 
calculating the value drivers are presented in Appendix 1.
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Table 12 Performance of the forward-looking value drivers using perfect foresight and full sample
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
PEG
Average Return 11% 20% 29% 39% 61% 32% 49.9% 1340
Median Return 8% 16% 23% 29% 40% 31.6%
Average Size 4022 2764 1698 1358 749 2118 -437%
Average PEG 8.74 0.90 0.50 0.28 0.11 2.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
37.3% 40.18*** 48.5%
PE-G1
Average Return 4% 11% 20% 33% 52% 24% 48.5% 1983
Median Return -3% 6% 16% 26% 34% 36.2%
Average Size 1569 2959 2612 1460 1170 1954 -34%
Average PE-G 80.03 20.20 0.18 -22.63 -574.01 -99.27
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
38.5% 50.78*** 48.0%
P/E
Average Return 7% 15% 23% 32% 55% 26% 47.3% 2222
Median Return -2% 8% 15% 22% 34% 36.6%
Average Size 2032 2593 2065 1429 830 1790 -145%
Average P/E 146.56 18.88 13.19 9.67 4.87 38.63
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
34.7% 45.44*** 46.0%
P/RI
Average Return 13% 18% 24% 34% 59% 29% 46.2% 1700
Median Return 4% 11% 17% 25% 38% 34.3%
Average Size 2111 3108 2677 1783 1082 2152 -95%
Average P/RI 362.03 36.06 23.13 15.82 7.45 88.89
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
32.9% 37.96*** 44.8%
Value Driver
(Table 12 continues)
This table summarizes the forward-looking value driver performance in the sample during 1975-2007. The value
driver is calculated for every stock separately using next year's fundamental data dated at the latest December 31st
(Y = 0). Each year the stocks are sorted according to the value driver and assigned to five equally sized portfolios.
The buy portfolio consists of the best 20% of stocks ranked by the value driver and so on. The portfolio returns are
calculated by using a one year buy-and-hold period starting on April 1st (Y = 0) and ending on March 31st (Y+1)
taking the average or median of the returns of all the stocks in the portfolio. Finally, the portfolio returns from
different years are combined by averaging them. Also the average market capitalization (size) is reported for all
portfolios. The buy vs. sell (hedge) return is calculated as the difference between the buy and sell portfolio returns.
The item "% of max" is the proportion of the value driver hedge return from the largest possible hedge return
achievable by sorting the stocks according to their stock returns directly. The t-stat is the t-value of the t-test testing
the statistical significance of the difference in buy and sell portfolio returns. The difference in averages is an
alternative way to calculate the hedge return used in the t-test.
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Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
ROE
Average Return 10% 14% 21% 27% 42% 23% 32.0% 2854
Median Return -7% 5% 13% 18% 26% 33.1%
Average Size 392 684 1213 1790 3063 1428 87%
Average ROE -0.64 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.62 0.06
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
21.5% 27.57*** 29.8%
P/B
Average Return 11% 18% 22% 27% 38% 23% 26.9% 2846
Median Return 1% 8% 11% 15% 22% 20.4%
Average Size 3054 1796 1063 755 454 1425 -572%
Average P/B 10.39 2.32 1.57 1.11 0.60 3.20
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
18.2% 31.12*** 28.4%
Growth
Average Return 18% 14% 18% 28% 39% 23% 21.4% 2890
Median Return 2% 3% 12% 20% 23% 20.8%
Average Size 682 1121 2357 1845 1038 1409 34%
Average Growth -6.17 -0.38 0.04 0.34 6.41 0.04
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
14.3% 18.05*** 17.6%
PB-ROE2
Average Return 10% 13% 20% 27% 45% 23% 35.0% 2859
Median Return -7% 4% 13% 19% 29% 35.9%
Average Size 434 762 1313 1950 2677 1427 84%
Average PB-ROE 70.74 -1.93 -9.58 -15.20 -51.81 -1.48
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
23.5% 30.15*** 32.7%
10xPB-ROE3
Average Return 10% 11% 17% 26% 51% 23% 41.4% 2859
Median Return -7% 0% 9% 18% 33% 40.5%
Average Size 1581 1911 1550 1180 912 1427 -73%
Average PB-ROE 184.32 19.44 7.92 1.39 -17.34 39.22
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
27.8% 36.42*** 38.6%
2 Calculated by subtracting the ROE (as percentage) from the P/B ratio
3 Calculated as PB-ROE, but P/B is magnified by 10 in order to make the two figure more comparable
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1% 
1 Calculated as normal PEG ratio but instead dividing by earnings growth the P/E ratio is subtracted by growth.
Value Driver
(Table 12 continues)
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The best value driver using perfect foresight is the PEG ratio. The traditional form of the value 
driver is able to create a 49.9% hedge return, which is up to 37.3% of the maximum return. An 
alternative format of the PEG ratio, where the P/E ratio is subtracted instead of being divided
by the growth rate, is able to generate even slightly higher proportion of the maximum return 
(38.5%). To distinguish the two ratios from each other the PEG ratio using subtraction is 
called the PE-G ratio in Table 12. The PE-G ratio is better also in the sense that it has less 
strict requirements for the data. The growth rate can be negative as well, and the sample size is 
therefore significantly higher when using this format. The size effect is also more subtle with 
the PE-G ratio. The average size of the companies in the sell portfolio is slightly higher than in 
the buy portfolio, but the biggest companies are in the portfolios in the middle portfolios. Still 
the portfolio returns behave coherently between all the five portfolios. As a conclusion, the 
PE-G ratio works really well with perfect foresight.
The plain P/E ratio performs relatively well too. The hedge return is 47.3%, which constitutes 
34.7% of maximum return. Overall the results are very similar to the PE-G ratio. The 4% 
difference in the proportion of theoretical maximum return can be considered relatively low at 
least when compared against the complexity that increases when incorporating the growth rate 
to the value driver. It seems that the GARP framework works under perfect foresight, but the 
advantage is perhaps not significant enough to justify the complicated calculation related to 
PEG or PE-G ratios. On the other hand, the size effect is clearly stronger in the P/E ratio than 
with the PE-G ratio.
The forward-looking P/RI ratio is estimated here in a similar manner as the backward-looking 
version. Now the EBIT is just taken from the next year’s financial statements. Again, the P/RI 
ratio performs surprisingly well when considering the heavy approximations used in 
calculating it. The P/RI ratio results in a high hedge return of 46.2% (32.9% of max) staying 
just behind the ordinary forward-looking P/E ratio. The buy portfolio of this value driver 
contains significantly smaller companies than the buy portfolio. 
The earnings growth rate showed absolutely no potential as a backward-looking value driver, 
but it is able to incorporate some future information. When applied with perfect foresight the 
value driver is able to create a 21.4% hedge margin, which is clearly statistically significant. 
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By looking at the average size of companies in the portfolio, we can see that there are two 
forces in play here. The buy portfolio actually has higher average size than the sell portfolio. It 
seems that now the effect of perfect foresight over the next year’s net earnings is slightly 
stronger than the opposite size effect. In the next section earnings growth will be tested after 
omitting the micro-caps. 
The P/B ratio does not improve its performance much under perfect foresight. As expected, it 
cannot incorporate future information in it very well. The only future fundamental used in 
calculating the value driver is the book value of equity in the next year. In practice this means 
that future performance is available only in the retained earnings, which is of course less 
informative than whole net earnings for example. The hedge return is still higher (27.1%) than 
when using historical fundamentals (13.1%). However, in terms of capability of capturing as 
much as possible from maximum return available the value driver stays clearly behind the 
PEG or P/E ratios. Similarly to the backward-looking P/B ratio the value driver is heavily 
correlated with size.
ROE improves its performance the most from its backward-looking version.  Now the value 
driver is able to achieve a 32% hedge return (21.5% of max). This is particularly significant 
because now the size is clearly reversed in the portfolios. The buy-side portfolios contain 
systematically larger companies than the sell portfolios. Thus, the future information content is 
very strong in the next year’s ROE, because it is able to achieve the high hedge return even 
with the opposing size-effect. This phenomenon is further studied in the next section where 
micro-caps are omitted from the sample. 
The last two value drivers in Table 12 are more experimental by their nature. An interesting 
combination from the viewpoint of this study would be the P/B ratio and ROE as mentioned in 
section 2.3.1. However, the most obvious way of combining them by dividing P/B ratio by
ROE leads to the regular P/E ratio. The PB/ROE value driver can be expressed in the
following form (P/bvps)/(eps/bvps), which simplifies to regular forward-looking P/E. One 
alternative is to use similar kind of subtraction as was done with PE-G. However, this is also 
problematic as P/B ratio and ROE have usually very different magnitudes. P/B ratios vary 
somewhere between 0-5 and ROE between +/- 50%. Ideally the two figures should be scaled 
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to the same magnitude before calculating any combined figure using subtraction. The two last 
items in Table 12 test these kinds of value drivers. The first one is PB-ROE figure as such and 
the second item is calculated by magnifying the P/B ratio by 10 in order make it better 
adjusted for ROE. In Table 12 we can see that the magnification by 10 works relatively well 
and it increases the hedge return relatively close to the P/E ratio (41.4%). The plain PB-ROE 
as such does not work as well, because now the ROE dominates the combination too heavily. 
Still the hedge return is 35.0%, which can be considered relatively good. Of the two 
combinations the 10xPB-ROE seems to be the better one. The examination of these two value 
drivers is, however, only preliminary in the sense that for any practical applications the 
weights between the two parameters would have to be carefully adjusted for optimal results. 
Nevertheless, these results show that the PB and ROE combination does have good potential 
for forward-looking value driver. The advantage of this value driver is that it might be able to
take the advantage of the value vs. growth anomaly using the strongest value driver, the P/B 
ratio, but still adjust for forecasts related to next years earnings through ROE.
4.2.2 Forward-looking value driver performance after omitting micro-caps 
In this section the forward-looking value driver results are rerun after omitting micro-caps, i.e. 
the bottom 20th percentile in terms of market capitalization. The method is similar to section 
4.1.2, where the same sensitivity analysis was done for backward-looking value drivers. The 
forward-looking value driver performance after omitting micro-caps can be seen in Table 13.
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Table 13 Performance of the forward-looking value drivers using perfect foresight after omitting micro-
caps
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
PEG
Average Return 10% 19% 26% 34% 46% 27% 36.1% 1071
Median Return 8% 16% 21% 26% 33% 25.1%
Average Size 4638 3377 2049 1899 1253 2643 -270%
Average PEG 9.61 0.99 0.57 0.33 0.14 2.33
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
31.3% 38.18*** 35.5%
PE-G
Average Return 2% 10% 19% 30% 42% 21% 39.6% 1585
Median Return -2% 6% 16% 24% 29% 31.2%
Average Size 2116 3527 3071 1859 1613 2437 -31%
Average PE-G 77.49 19.31 1.00 -18.88 -519.69 -88.17
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
35.3% 49.39*** 39.3%
P/E
Average Return 6% 14% 20% 28% 41% 22% 35.2% 1777
Median Return -3% 8% 14% 21% 28% 31.1%
Average Size 2479 3067 2479 1836 1303 2233 -90%
Average P/E 142.39 19.21 13.70 10.32 5.68 38.26
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
29.8% 42.31*** 34.0%
P/RI
Average Return 10% 15% 21% 29% 44% 24% 33.3% 1359
Median Return 3% 10% 15% 22% 32% 29.1%
Average Size 2547 3548 3336 2348 1646 2685 -55%
Average P/RI 329.10 36.90 24.27 17.11 8.82 83.24
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
28.0% 35.24*** 31.9%
ROE
Average Return 5% 12% 19% 24% 36% 19% 31.5% 2282
Median Return -7% 5% 13% 17% 24% 31.8%
Average Size 585 1022 1553 2168 3581 1782 84%
Average ROE -0.53 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.65 0.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
24.2% 32.36*** 30.3%
Growth
Average Return 11% 10% 16% 25% 33% 19% 22.6% 2311
Median Return 0% 3% 13% 20% 21% 21.2%
Average Size 939 1545 2895 2079 1328 1757 29%
Average Growth -5.17 -0.30 0.07 0.33 6.18 0.22
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
17.3% 22.07*** 19.1%
Similar calculation methods as in Table 12, but now the bottom 20th percentile of smallest stocks in terms of market 
capitalization (micro-caps) have been omitted from the sample. 
Value Driver
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In general the results are in line with the similar sensitivity analysis performed for the 
backward-looking value drivers. Those value drivers that are positively correlated with market 
capitalization lose some of their hedge returns. Interestingly, however, this time the value 
drivers that are negatively correlated with size, such as ROE, stay mostly just unaffected by 
the omission. The PE-G ratio is still the best forward-looking value driver and the regular 
forward-looking P/E ratio also performs well.  
Although the average hedge returns decrease for most of the value drivers after omitting the 
micro-caps the proportion of maximum return is less affected. The reason for this phenomenon 
is that the maximum hedges return available decreases also significantly after omitting the 
micro-caps that produce the highest stock returns. This also emphasizes the goodness of the 
‘% of max’ as criterion for choosing the best forward-looking value drivers.
The earnings growth and ROE are interesting forward-looking value drivers in the sense that 
they have two opposing effects embedded in them. The first one is the future information 
content that both value drivers can incorporate relatively well. The opposing force is the size-
effect as both value drivers are negatively correlated with market capitalization. Indeed, 
earnings growth is able to marginally improve its performance after omitting the micro-caps 
especially when looking at the measure ‘% of Max’. ROE is also able to improve the 
proportion of maximum return that it captures, but in terms of absolute hedge margin, the 
value driver remains on the same level. As a conclusion, it seems that the effect of new 
information in these value drivers is much stronger than the plain size-effect.
4.2.3 Forward-looking value driver performance after omitting extreme value driver 
observations
In this section the extreme value driver observations are omitted from the sample in the same
manner as in section 4.1.3. The 1% highest and lowest values of the value drivers are omitted. 
The omission is done for the sample where micro-caps have already been omitted. Thus, this 
sample should be as clean as possible from these biases. The results are shown in Table 14.
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Table 14 Performance of the forward-looking value drivers using perfect foresight after omitting micro-
caps and extreme value driver observations
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
PEG
Average Return 10% 19% 26% 34% 46% 27% 36.0% 1049
Median Return 8% 16% 21% 25% 33% 25.2%
Average Size 4653 3390 2047 1907 1304 2660 -257%
Average PEG 3.85 0.98 0.57 0.33 0.15 1.18
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
31.3% 37.72*** 35.6%
PE-G
Average Return 3% 10% 20% 29% 41% 21% 38.9% 1552
Median Return -2% 7% 16% 24% 29% 30.6%
Average Size 2122 3579 3082 1873 1634 2458 -30%
Average PE-G 61.30 18.81 1.03 -18.19 -134.27 -14.26
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
35.1% 49.09*** 38.5%
P/E
Average Return 6% 15% 20% 28% 41% 22% 35.1% 1740
Median Return -2% 8% 14% 21% 29% 30.9%
Average Size 2580 3045 2483 1854 1354 2263 -91%
Average P/E 56.41 19.04 13.70 10.39 6.06 21.12
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
29.8% 41.76*** 34.0%
P/RI
Average Return 11% 16% 21% 28% 44% 24% 33.7% 1331
Median Return 3% 10% 15% 22% 33% 29.6%
Average Size 2574 3574 3372 2362 1709 2718 -51%
Average P/RI 132.65 36.47 24.27 17.26 9.44 44.02
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
28.3% 35.1*** 32.4%
ROE
Average Return 5% 12% 19% 24% 35% 19% 30.3% 2236
Median Return -7% 5% 13% 17% 24% 30.6%
Average Size 601 1031 1558 2156 3668 1803 84%
Average ROE -0.22 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.34 0.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
23.7% 32.09*** 29.5%
Growth
Average Return 11% 10% 16% 25% 34% 19% 22.7% 2264
Median Return 0% 3% 12% 19% 21% 21.4%
Average Size 948 1560 2920 2082 1369 1776 31%
Average Growth -2.26 -0.29 0.07 0.32 1.98 -0.03
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
17.5% 22.25*** 19.3%
Similar calculation methods as in Table 12, but now in addition to micro-caps also 1% of the highest and lowest value 
driver observations are omitted.
Value Driver
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Similarly to the sensitivity analysis performed on the backward-looking value drivers the 
effect of omitting extreme value driver observations is very weak for forward-looking value 
drivers as well. Again the value driver averages in the buy and sell portfolio move closer to 
each other but in terms of portfolio returns the changes are minimal. The effect could have 
been stronger when using the forward-looking value drivers, because the fundamentals used in 
calculating the value drivers play a bigger part here. However, this seems not to be the case. 
All in all, it is clear that the results are relatively insensitive to extreme value driver 
observations and therefore in the following phases of the study this particular sensitivity 
analysis is not conducted anymore. 
4.2.4 Conclusions on the performance of value drivers using perfect foresight
The buy vs. sell returns of the value drivers increase dramatically when perfect foresight is 
applied. This is natural as information from the future is included in the value drivers that
surely cannot yet be reflected in the stock prices. The best value drivers can generate almost 
up to 40% of the theoretical maximum return. Naturally, if any common forecast errors were 
included, the hedge returns would decrease respectively. In the next phase of this study, the 
value driver performance is tested with real analyst data. The idea is to see whether any hedge 
returns are left when using real forecasts that have errors and biases in them. This analysis also 
gives us one measure of how good forecasts analysts are able to make.
The key finding of this section was that the PEG or PE-G value drivers were the most 
sensitive to the new information available. They are the best value drivers to incorporate 
unbiased accurate forecasts and generate stock recommendation based on those forecasts. 
However, the regular forward-looking P/E ratio did not perform much worse. The advantage 
of the P/E ratio is its simplicity, a characteristic that should not be underestimated. In fact, the 
difference between the P/E ratio and the PEG ratio was so small that justifying the use of the 
more complex PEG ratio is somewhat difficult. In addition, the PEG ratio did underperform 
the PE ratio in its backward-looking version. This could imply that the better performance of 
the forward-looking PEG ratio is merely due to its ‘hyper-sensitivity’ to future earnings, but
not its so-called growth-at-reasonable-price (GARP) features. Later, in the context of real 
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forecasts hyper-sensitivity could become an issue since then the value driver would be hyper-
sensitive to forecasts errors as well.
Finally, two more value drivers showed some good forward-looking value driver potential. 
Again the P/RI ratio was able to achieve good results despite the heavy approximations used 
in calculating it. The strong link to shareholder value seems to be important for the value 
drivers. Also the combination of P/B and ROE could probably be further developed into a 
good forward-looking value driver, with a similar kind of GARP framework as in the PEG 
ratio. However, the exact calculation methods need to be heavily tested first. Developing both 
of these value drivers provide excellent topics for future research.  
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5 PERFORMANCE OF VALUE DRIVER GENERATED RECOMMENDATIONS 
USING ANALYST FORECASTS
In this section, the analyst forecasts are applied to the forward-looking value drivers presented 
above. This examination reveals if the EPS forecasts of the analysts contain valuable 
information that could be turned into profitable investment recommendations by using the 
value drivers tested in this study. The recommendations generated using value drivers are later 
called auto-recommendations. Secondly, these auto-recommendations are compared against 
real consensus recommendations of the analysts. The purpose of this examination is to see 
whether a simple value driver based sorting method could generate better recommendations 
than the analysts’ current ad hoc methods.
The data sample is smaller in these analyses because the EPS forecasts in the IBES database 
are available only from 1984 onwards. Moreover, the EPS is the only forecast item widely 
available in the database, which restricts the number of value drivers that can be tested with 
real analyst data. The analyst recommendations are available in the database only from 1994 
onwards, which cuts the observation period to only 13 years. Shorter observation period 
means that the sample is more vulnerable to single economic up- and downturns. The dot-com 
bubble in the beginning of the millennium explains the most radical stock returns in these 
samples and therefore additional sensitivity analysis is conducted to controlling the effect of 
the dot-com bubble. 
The analyst forecasts and recommendations are taken from March each year. The buy-and-
hold period starts from April 1st as previously. Using the analyst data gathered in March means 
that the consensus forecasts and recommendations should be available at the portfolio 
formation day. The exact formulas used in calculating the value drivers are presented in 
Appendix 1.
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5.1 Profitability of auto-recommendations using analyst forecasts
In this section the IBES analyst EPS forecast data is used to generate auto-recommendations. 
The idea is to assign the stocks into five portfolios in a similar manner as in the previous 
chapter. This time, however, the forecasts for forward-looking value drivers are taken from 
real analyst consensus forecasts. As we saw in section 3.3.2 the dominance of micro-caps is 
not a critical issue when using analyst data, because the data sample itself is biased towards 
bigger companies as analysts do not generally follow the smaller stocks. Therefore, the micro-
caps are not omitted from the sample when using analyst data.
5.1.1 Auto-recommendation profitability using full sample
First, the profitability of the auto-recommendations generated using analyst EPS forecasts are 
calculated using the full sample. All value drivers that showed clear potential in the previous 
chapter have been included if the value driver can be calculated using only earnings forecasts. 
Some interesting value drivers such as the P/RI had to be left out, because the IBES database 
does not contain enough observations for other items than EPS. The results of auto-
recommendation profitability using the full sample are shown in Table 15.
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Table 15 Profitability of auto-recommendations using analyst EPS forecasts
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All
Buy vs. 
Sell N
P/E
Average Return 15% 15% 17% 18% 21% 17% 6.5% 2106
Median Return 4% 8% 11% 13% 14% 10.3%
Average Size 2656 3045 3109 2398 1821 2606 -46%
Average P/E 69.04 21.26 16.10 12.93 9.27 25.72
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
5.2% 5.55*** 5.2%
PEG
Average Return 15% 16% 17% 15% 18% 16% 2.8% 1270
Median Return 10% 11% 10% 8% 9% -1.7%
Average Size 5012 4324 2766 2205 1743 3210 -188%
Average PEG 14.96 1.41 0.86 0.51 0.24 3.59
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
2.3% 2.34** 3.2%
PE-G
Average Return 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% -0.8% 1838
Median Return 10% 12% 12% 10% 7% -2.6%
Average Size 2131 3790 3865 2412 2053 2850 -4%
Average PE-G 70.91 19.18 5.89 -9.32 -416.09 -65.90
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-0.7% 0.15 0.2%
Growth
Average Return 18% 18% 17% 16% 16% 17% -1.8% 1798
Median Return 11% 12% 11% 10% 7% -4.2%
Average Size 1486 3043 4387 3408 2164 2897 31%
Average Growth -52.24 0.15 27.31 66.44 1067.70 221.85
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-1.5% -1.8* -1.7%
ROE
Average Return 21% 18% 17% 18% 17% 18% -4.7% 2384
Median Return 5% 11% 11% 11% 10% 5.4%
Average Size 514 1243 1675 2483 5627 2308 91%
Average ROE -0.38 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.51 0.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-3.4% -5.92*** -7.0%
* significant at 10% level, ** 5% and *** 1% 
Value Driver
1 Calculated as normal PEG ratio but instead dividing by earnings growth the P/E ratio is subtracted by growth.
Profitability of auto-recommendations calculated based on forward-looking value drivers in 1984-2007. The value
drivers use the analysts' consensus EPS forecasts for the next year (EPS Y1). The consensus forecasts are taken
from March (Y=0) each year. The stocks are sorted according to the value driver and assigned to the five equally
sized portfolios. The portfolio returns are calculated by using a one year buy-and-hold period starting on April 1st (Y
= 0) and ending on March 31st (Y+1) taking the average or median of the returns of all the stocks in the portfolio.
Finally, the portfolio returns from different years are combined by averaging them. Also the average market
capitalization (size) is reported for all portfolios. The hedge return is calculated as the difference between the buy
and sell portfolio returns. The item "% of max" is the proportion of the value driver hedge margin from the largest
possible hedge margin achievable by sorting the stocks according to their stock returns directly. The t-stat is the t-
value of the t-test testing the statistical significance of the difference in buy and sell portfolio returns. The difference
in averages is an alternative way to calculate the hedge margin used in the t-test.
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The best value driver using the analyst forecasts is the ordinary forward-looking P/E ratio. 
However, compared to the buy vs. sell returns achieved under perfect foresight, the hedge 
return of 6.5% cannot be considered very high. This tells that the analyst forecasts are hardly 
perfect or anywhere near it. This was expected since any real forecasts suffer from serious 
forecasting errors and biases that are not present when using the perfect foresight method. 
Interestingly, the forward-looking value drivers using analyst forecasts have serious 
difficulties in outperforming the backward-looking value drivers calculated in the beginning. 
The backward-looking P/E ratio was able to produce an 8.3% hedge margin in section 4.1.1. 
However, the figure is not exactly comparable since the sample is not the same. As mentioned 
earlier, the analysts do not follow the smallest companies, and this skews the sample towards 
bigger companies. In Table 16 the backward-looking P/E ratio is recalculated with the same 
sample as in Table 15. As we can see, now the hedge return of the backward-looking P/E ratio 
drops to 5.0% (median 9.6%), which is slightly lower than the 6.5% (median 10.3%) achieved 
by analyst forecasts. This implies that analyst forecasts have some new information content 
compared to purely historical fundamental analysis, but the information value is alarmingly 
low. From the viewpoint of the analysts the issue is particularly alarming when the 
performance of the analyst forecasts is compared to results of the perfect foresight method, 
which showed the great potential of the value drivers, assuming that forecasts accuracy was 
significantly better. 
Table 16 Performance of the backward-looking P/E ratio using the IBES sample
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All Buy vs. 
Sell
N
P/E
Average Return 15% 15% 16% 18% 20% 17% 5.0% 1863
Median Return 5% 9% 11% 12% 14% 9.6%
Average Size 3044 3709 3104 2451 1769 2815 -72%
Average P/E 186.00 25.56 17.89 13.32 7.07 49.96
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
4.1% 3.3*** 3.6%
Backward-looking P/E ratio performance with the same sample as in Table 15. The calculation method is the same as 
in Table 7, where the performance of backward-looking value drivers was tested. This time the sample is restricted to  
companies that have consensus EPS forecasts available. In other words, these results are directly comparable to the 
auto-recommendation profitability reported in Table 10. 
Value Driver
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Otherwise the P/E ratio seems to be perform relatively well under analyst forecasts as well. 
The median buy vs. sell return is significantly higher than the average hedge return, which 
indicates that extreme stock returns diminish the gap between buy and sell portfolios. One 
possible reason is the small number of growth companies that actually turn out to be worth the 
high P/E ratio.  These would significantly increase the average return of the sell portfolio, 
which is indeed 10% higher than the respective median return. Although the average size in 
the sample is significantly higher when using the analyst forecasts, there is still a certain level 
of correlation between the average size and the portfolios. The smallest companies are 
emphasized in the buy portfolio although the difference is not very big. 
Surprisingly, the other value drivers in Table 15 underperform the P/E ratio by a wide margin. 
In particular the performance of the PEG and PE-G ratios is disappointing. The PEG ratio 
clearly underperforms the P/E ratio when using the analyst data. Under perfect foresight the 
situation was the other way around. Perhaps the PEG ratio is already too sensitive to the future 
forecasts and therefore the value driver adjusts too precisely to the overoptimistic and biased 
forecasts. 
The growth and ROE value drivers result in negative hedge returns as they did when they were 
applied in their backward-looking forms. The hedge return of growth is statistically 
insignificant and no investment strategies could be conducted using only that value driver. 
ROE results in higher negative return, but as its backward-looking version it is highly 
correlated with size. The stocks in the sell portfolio are ten times smaller than the stocks in the 
buy portfolio. As a conclusion, ROE’s performance remains at the same low level as in 
previous analyses. 
5.1.2 Auto-recommendation profitability after omitting the dot-com bubble
Barber et al. (2003) show that the dot-com bubble that burst in 2001 has significant effects on 
any study using analyst forecasts. They show that the accuracy of analyst recommendations 
deteriorated significantly during the dot-com boom and bust. Their main argument is that 
additional sensitivity analysis is needed, where year 2000 and 2001 are omitted as outliers in 
analyst accuracy. In this section the forward-looking value drivers using analyst data are tested 
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in a similar manner. In Table 17 the forward-looking P/E ratio performance is presented at a 
detailed year-level. As we can see, the buy vs. sell return varies quite much between the years. 
However, years 1999 and 2000 are clear exceptions. In year 1999 the value driver creates a 
negative buy vs. sell return of -70%. Respectively in year 2000 the value driver creates a 
positive buy vs. sell return of 64%. These hedge returns are clearly non-typical in the data. 
The extreme years, i.e. 1999 and 2000, in this study are one year off from the years identified 
by Barber et al. (2003). One possible explanation for this is that Barber et al. (2003) 
rebalanced their portfolio daily in their study. Therefore, their results place the extremes 
exactly to the right days, months and years. In this study a one year buy-and-hold period is 
used and the period starts from April and ends in March the next year. For example, the S&P 
500 index peaked at March 2000, which is still calculated under year 1999 in this study. 
Table 17 Performance of the forward-looking P/E ratio using analyst forecasts at year-level
Year Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All Buy vs. Sell N
1984 2% 11% 18% 24% 27% 16% 25% 1442
1985 24% 29% 34% 37% 45% 34% 21% 1493
1986 16% 20% 16% 22% 24% 20% 8% 1454
1987 -11% -9% -4% -4% -10% -8% 1% 1554
1988 10% 15% 16% 19% 21% 16% 11% 1586
1989 17% 14% 11% 9% 7% 12% -10% 1629
1990 19% 16% 16% 9% 8% 14% -11% 1646
1991 19% 16% 20% 23% 28% 21% 10% 1684
1992 10% 10% 17% 18% 18% 15% 9% 1803
1993 11% 11% 9% 7% 12% 10% 1% 1990
1994 13% 13% 12% 11% 6% 11% -7% 2238
1995 42% 29% 28% 27% 26% 30% -16% 2399
1996 -3% 9% 12% 13% 20% 10% 22% 2587
1997 42% 42% 44% 44% 51% 45% 8% 2823
1998 1% -8% -12% -14% -20% -11% -21% 2864
1999 102% 49% 48% 47% 31% 55% -70% 2644
2000 -42% -12% 4% 19% 21% -2% 64% 2503
2001 13% 18% 27% 35% 51% 29% 38% 2297
2002 -31% -22% -22% -18% -11% -21% 19% 2014
2003 84% 75% 68% 68% 97% 79% 14% 2116
2004 0% 3% 13% 18% 23% 11% 23% 2327
2005 30% 28% 24% 23% 25% 26% -5% 2443
2006 7% 7% 12% 15% 16% 11% 10% 2511
2007 -14% -8% -7% -9% -2% -8% 13% 2495
Average 15% 15% 17% 18% 21% 17% 7% 2106
Portfolio returns of the P/E ratio at a year-level. The calculation method and sample is similar to Table 15.
The portfolio returns for all portfolios are presented for each year. N denotes the number of stocks in the
sample each year.
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The dynamics of the dot-com effect are quite clear. During the steepest boom on the markets 
the value driver approach could not explain the stock returns and the buy vs. sell return 
became significantly negative. In other words, companies with already high P/E ratios 
outperformed the low P/E stocks in the dot-com boom. However, when the bubble burst the 
value driver quickly improved its performance as the high P/E stocks turned out to be bad 
investments after all. As Barber et al. (2003) suggest the dot-com years seem like outliers in 
this study as well. Therefore, the results are rerun after omitting years 1999 and 2000 from the 
sample. These results can be seen in Table 18.
Table 18 Profitability of auto-recommendations using analyst EPS forecasts after omitting years 1999-2000
Sell Reduce Hold Accum. Buy All Buy vs. 
Sell
N
P/E
Average Return 14% 14% 16% 17% 21% 16% 7.4% 2063
Median Return 5% 9% 11% 13% 15% 9.5%
Average Size 1881 2794 3143 2487 1928 2446 2%
Average P/E 62.02 20.89 16.11 13.07 9.44 24.31
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
6.3% 8.53*** 7.0%
PEG
Average Return 15% 16% 15% 15% 17% 16% 1.8% 1250
Median Return 12% 12% 10% 9% 9% -3.0%
Average Size 4154 4127 2771 2118 1802 2994 -130%
Average PEG 15.32 1.40 0.86 0.51 0.24 3.67
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
1.6% 1.46 1.9%
Growth
Average Return 16% 17% 17% 15% 16% 16% -0.7% 1765
Median Return 11% 12% 12% 11% 8% -2.7%
Average Size 1486 3043 4387 3408 2164 2897 31%
Average Growth -51.30 0.60 27.45 66.40 1078.82 224.36
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-0.7% -0.45 -0.4%
ROE
Average Return 18% 17% 16% 17% 16% 17% -1.7% 2325
Median Return 5% 11% 11% 11% 11% 6.4%
Average Size 514 1243 1675 2483 5627 2308 91%
Average ROE -0.34 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.49 0.10
Buy vs. Sell Diagnostis % of Max t-stat diff. in averages
-1.3% -2.64*** -2.6%
Performance of forward-looking value drivers with analyst data after omitting years 1999 and 2000. Otherwise the 
calculation method and the sample is the same as in Table 15 (1984-2007). 
Value Driver
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Although the individual buy vs. sell returns in years 1999 and 2000 were very dramatic the 
performance of the value drivers does not change significantly after omitting these years from 
the sample. The overall buy vs. sell return of the P/E ratio increases 1 percentage point to 
7.5%. The biggest effect can be seen in ROE, where the negative buy vs. sell return almost 
disappears. Although the changes in the value driver performance after omitting 1999 and 
2000 were found to be minimal in this study, Barber et al. (2003) still have a good point in 
warning other researchers about the dangers involved in those years. In this study the two 
years nicely balance each other out as the buy vs. sell return was -70% in year 1999 and then 
+64% in year 2000. Thus, when both are included or omitted from the sample there are no 
significant distortions. However, if the buy-and-hold period is chosen unfortunately and wrong 
years are omitted (e.g. in this study year 2000 and 2001) the results would get heavily biased, 
because the counter-effect would be neglected. The conclusion of this sensitivity analysis is 
that years 1999 and 2000 can be included in sample as long as they are both included in their 
full extent. 
5.1.3 Conclusions on the profitability of auto-recommendations using analyst forecasts
Despite the many potential forward-looking value drivers identified in section 4.1.1 only the 
P/E ratio seemed to have serious investment value when real analyst forecasts were applied. 
Perhaps the biggest disappointment was the PEG ratio which lost all its potential when tested 
with analyst data. The other potential value drivers could not be tested because the only item 
widely available in the IBES analyst data was the earnings per share forecasts.
The performance of the P/E ratio was not great either. The forward-looking P/E ratio with 
analyst forecasts outperformed the backward-looking version of the value driver only 
marginally. Thus, the usefulness of analyst forecasts can be considered somewhat 
questionable. As we saw in the context of perfect foresight, however, there is great potential if 
the forecasts would be accurate and unbiased.  
- 69 -
5.2 Auto-recommendations vs. analysts’ consensus recommendations
In this section, the auto-recommendations calculated using the value drivers are compared 
against the analysts’ real stock recommendations. The purpose is to see whether using a value 
driver based recommendation model could be used to improve the consensus 
recommendations. The data sample is again smaller than in the previous analyses as the 
analyst recommendations are available only from 1994 onwards. The consensus 
recommendation is derived from the number of strong buy, buy, hold, underperform, and sell 
recommendations issued by the analysts in March each year. The buy-and-hold period starts 
on April 1st as before. The consensus forecasts is calculated as an average after assigning 
number 1 for sell recommendations and number 5 for strong buy recommendation.
5.2.1 Auto-recommendation vs. analyst’s consensus recommendation profitability using full 
sample
First, the auto-recommendations created by the forward-looking value drivers using analyst 
forecasts are compared against the consensus recommendations using the full sample. These
results are shown in Table 19.
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Table 19 Auto-recommendation vs. consensus recommendation profitability using full sample
Sell Reduce Hold Accumul. Buy All N Buy vs. Sell
P/E
Value Driver Performance
Average 17% 15% 18% 19% 24% 19% 2205 6.0%
Median 3% 7% 10% 11% 14% 9% 6.1%
Size 4009 4546 4414 3301 2559 3766
Average P/E 88 12 9 7 5 30.8
Analyst Recommendation Performance
Average 22% 19% 19% 17% 17% 19% 2205 -5.4%
Median 11% 11% 9% 7% 6% 9% -2.1%
Size 2129 4507 5104 5386 1705 3766
Average P/E 31 15 15 16 16 31
PEG
Value Driver Performance
Average 15% 16% 18% 16% 20% 17% 1298 4.6%
Median 8% 10% 9% 8% 9% 9% 0.6%
Size 7758 6020 3934 3253 2507 4694
Average PEG 12.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 3.1
Analyst Recommendation Performance
Average 19% 17% 17% 16% 16% 17% 1298 -2.3%
Median 11% 10% 9% 7% 7% 9% -2.0%
Size 2779 6225 6263 6323 1884 4694
Average PEG 3.5 2.2 1.3 1.7 1.1 3.1
Value Driver
The auto-recommendation profitablity of the forward-looking value drivers using analyst forecasts is compared to the 
profitablity of the analyst consensus recommendations. The data is from years 1994-2007. The value driver 
performance is calculated similarly as in Table 15 using the analyst forecasts. The consensus recommendations are 
calculated from the analyst recommendations by weighting the buy recommendations by 5 and the sell 
recommendations by 1. The average of the given recommendations is used as the consensus recommendation. In 
calculating the profitability of the analyst recommendations the stocks are sorted according to the consensus 
recommendations into five equally weighted portfolios. The recommendation distribution is heavily skewed towards 
buy, but in this analysis the bias is corrected by making five portfolios with the same amount of stocks in each one.  
The EPS forecasts and stock recommendations are taken from March (Y =0). The buy-and-hold period starts from 
April 1st (Y=0) and ends on March 31st (Y+1).
As we saw in the previous section, the best value driver to be used in creating the auto-
recommendation is the ordinary P/E ratio. In this smaller sample from 1994-2007 the buy vs. 
sell return is 6.0%, which is relatively close to the return reported in Table 15. The most 
interesting part of the results is that the consensus recommendations show negative buy vs. 
sell returns (-5.4%). In other words, the quality of analyst recommendations is extremely 
weak. The fact is that by investing in stocks that have lower stock market recommendations, 
the investor could get higher returns than investing in stocks that analysts recommend.
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Another interesting fact that can be seen in Table 19 is that the analysts follow the P/E 
framework in making their recommendations at least to some extent. This effect has also been 
documented by Jegadeesh et al. (2004). In the portfolios formed after consensus 
recommendations the average P/E ratio of the sell portfolio is two times larger than the 
average P/E ratio of the buy portfolio. It seems that increasing correlation of the 
recommendations with the P/E ratio more systematically could improve the recommendation 
quality.
The other value driver that showed even remote potential in Table 15 was the PEG ratio. In
this subsample as well it clearly underperforms the P/E ratio. The PEG ratio limits the number 
of stocks in the sample due to positive earnings and growth requirements. In this subsample 
the consensus recommendations have smaller negative buy vs. sell returns, but still the value 
driver clearly outperforms the analysts in making stock recommendations.
5.2.2 Auto-recommendations vs. consensus recommendations after omitting the dot-com 
bubble
In particular Barber et al. (2003) argued that the analyst recommendations were significantly 
inaccurate during the dot-com bubble in 2000 and 2001. As we saw in section 5.1.2, in this 
study the dot-com effect can be seen in years 1999 and 2000. The auto-recommendations are 
compared to the consensus recommendations also after omitting these years as Barber et al. 
(2003) suggest. These results are shown in Table 20.
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Table 20 Auto-recommendation vs. consensus recommendation profitability after omitting years 1999-
2000
Sell Reduce Hold Accumul. Buy All N Buy vs. Sell
P/E
Value Driver Performance
Average 15% 14% 17% 17% 23% 17% 2183 8.0%
Median 5% 9% 10% 12% 15% 10% 5.3%
Size 4009 4546 4414 3301 2559 3766
Average P/E 77.6 12.1 9.2 7.4 5.3 29.0
Analyst Recommendation Performance
Average 22% 17% 16% 15% 16% 17% 2183 -5.6%
Median 12% 12% 10% 9% 8% 10% -1.8%
Size 2129 4507 5104 5386 1705 3766
Average P/E 30.1 14.2 14.6 14.1 14.9 29.0
PEG
Value Driver Performance
Average 15% 16% 16% 15% 19% 16% 1285 3.5%
Median 11% 11% 9% 9% 10% 10% -0.6%
Size 7758 6020 3934 3253 2507 4694
Average PEG 12.5 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 3.1
Analyst Recommendation Performance
Average 18% 17% 15% 15% 15% 16% 1285 -3.4%
Median 12% 11% 9% 9% 8% 10% -2.0%
Size 2779 6225 6263 6323 1884 4694
Average PEG 3.5 2.2 1.3 1.8 1.1 3.1
Auto-recommendation profitability compared against the consensus recommendation profitability after omitting year 
1999 and 2000. Otherwise the calculation method is similar to Table 19.
Value Driver
After omitting the dot-com effect from the sample the results are even more explicit. The gap 
between the auto-recommendation and consensus recommendation profitability just widens. 
Now the P/E ratio is able to achieve a 8.0% positive buy vs. sell return whereas the respective 
analyst recommendation result in a -5.6% negative buy vs. sell return. There are no dramatic 
changes in the profitability of the consensus recommendations after omitting the dot-com
effect as suggested by Barber et al. (2003). One possible reason for the smaller effect is that 
this study uses a one year holding period instead daily portfolio rebalancing used by Barber et 
al. (2003). The longer holding period could smooth the effect, because the most flagrant 
overreactions might be already corrected before the next March when the consensus 
recommendations are gathered again. In the daily rebalancing all extremes during the year are 
duly accounted for.
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5.2.3 Conclusions on the auto-recommendation vs. consensus recommendation profitability
The most important finding of this section was that the auto-recommendation model using the 
P/E ratio and analyst forecasts is able to significantly outperform the consensus 
recommendations of the analysts themselves. This implies that analysts would be better off in 
utilizing a systematic approach in making recommendations compared to their current 
methods. The better performance of auto-recommendations using analyst forecasts compared 
to analysts’ own consensus recommendations means also that analysts do a better job in 
making forecasts than recommendations. This is actually quite natural as mentioned in 
Chapter 1. In making the forecasts, the analyst can concentrate on company specific issues 
only. The historical trends in earnings and managements assessments give some information 
that can be used in deriving the future forecasts. On the contrary, in making the stock 
recommendation the analyst has to consider the current price-level of the stock and compare it
against other stocks in the market. The findings of this study suggest that equity analysts could 
use the auto-recommendation decision-aid tool to create better stock recommendations based 
on their forecasts. This would also bring a top-down approach in making the stock 
recommendation, which could lead to smaller biases in terms of too optimistic 
recommendations. When ranking the stocks systematically according to a value driver, some 
stocks have to be placed in the sell portfolio as well.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the main results of the study are summarized by repeating the research 
question and reflecting the empirical results on it. Next the practical implications of this study 
are discussed and some possible practical applications are outlined. Finally, the future research 
questions raised by this study are specified.
6.1 Summary of the main results
The research question in this study was “What forward-looking value drivers provide the best 
basis for investment strategy using the most accurate, unbiased forecasts available?”
Answering the research question started with a literature review where the most influential 
value drivers of the previous studies were identified. The list of value drivers gathered from 
existing literature was first applied to only historical fundamental data. These results provided 
us a lower limit on the returns that should be expected in the following stages. The stocks were 
sorted into five equally sized portfolios according to different value drivers and the average 
returns of the portfolios were compared. Particularly interesting was the difference between 
the two extreme portfolios (buy and sell), because this represents the return of an investment 
strategy where the buy portfolio is purchased and the sell portfolio is shorted. The best 
backward-looking value drivers in terms of buy vs. sell return seemed to be the price-to-book 
(P/B) and the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio. Among these value drivers the distorting effect 
small-cap companies was relatively strong. Actually, the best historical value driver would 
have been the market capitalization of the company itself. A significant part of the value driver 
performance of the P/B and P/E ratios was due to the size effect. Still after controlling the size 
effect by omitting micro-caps from the sample, the P/B and P/E ratios resulted in statistically 
significant buy vs. sell portfolio returns.
Next, the perfect foresight method was applied to the data and the performance of the value 
drivers was tested with future fundamentals consisting of next year’s unpublished financial 
figures. This time a more sophisticated value driver, the price-earnings-growth (PEG) ratio, 
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seemed to provide the best results, but it was closely followed by the common forward-
looking P/E ratio. Both ratios showed that with accurate forecasts significant, up to 50% buy 
vs. sell returns could be achieved. The P/B ratio could not capture much of the new available 
information and performed poorly. At this stage it became clear that P/E or PEG ratio were the 
best value drivers to be used as forward-looking value drivers. 
The value drivers were further tested with real analyst consensus forecasts to see what kind of 
returns they could provide with non-perfect estimates on future fundamentals. This phase also 
provided a way to analyze the information content of equity analyst forecasts, i.e. whether 
analyst forecasts have investment value as such or not. The results were somewhat 
controversial. On the other hand, the P/E ratio with analysts’ forecasted earnings resulted in 
6.5% buy vs. sell return, and the return was shown to be statistically significant. However, the 
buy vs. sell return was only minimally higher than the buy vs. sell return achieved by the 
backward-looking P/E ratio, which used no forecasts at all. This questions the true information 
content of analyst forecasts. The perfect foresight approach applied earlier, however, clearly 
showed that there is great potential in using these value drivers if the forecasts would be any 
better. As mentioned in many studies, the analyst forecasts are generally heavily biased 
upwards and they suffer from many other conflicts of interests as well. The same conclusion 
can be made also on the basis of this study. 
The final stage of this study was the comparison between the value driver generated auto-
recommendations and the analysts’ own consensus stock recommendations. Again the buy vs. 
sell returns were used as the comparison criteria. The results were undisputable. Following the 
analyst consensus recommendations is clearly not profitable. In fact, the analyst 
recommendations yielded a negative -5.4% buy vs. sell return. For the same sample the value 
driver method with simple P/E ratio yielded a positive 6.5% buy vs. sell return. Thus, analysts
would be better off making recommendations with a systematic value driver based decision-
aid rather than their current methods. Also investors would be better off entering the analyst 
consensus forecasts into the auto-recommendation model rather than following the analysts’ 
own consensus recommendations.
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In conclusion, this study confirmed that simple value drivers, such as the P/E or PEG ratio, 
sort stocks in portfolios that provide significant buy vs. sell returns. In accordance with 
anomaly studies, the effect is present already when applying historical data. When the perfect 
forecasts are applied to the value drivers the buy vs. sell returns increase significantly. This 
confirms that these simple value drivers could be used to systematically take advantage of 
good, unbiased estimates. In testing the drivers with perfect foresight, we saw that some less 
often used value drivers showed significant potential for explaining future stock returns. 
Utilizing these drivers in practice, however, requires better and more comprehensive forecasts 
and some more development work in terms of fine-tuning the value drivers themselves. 
Finally, the information value of analyst forecasts was left questionable in this study. It seems 
that the forecasts are so biased that value drivers based on these figures are not even 
significantly better than backward-looking value drivers. However, when compared against 
real analyst consensus recommendations, the auto-recommendations generated using analyst 
forecasts outperformed the analysts’ own consensus recommendations by a wide margin.
6.2 Practical implications of the study
In this study we saw that the analyst do better in making the numerical forecasts than the 
recommendations. Using a decision-aid tool to create auto-recommendations based on the 
value drivers presented in this study could increase the quality of the analyst 
recommendations. Systematic ranking of stocks with the value drivers could help the analysts 
to see the bigger picture and the implication of their forecasts in terms of other investment 
opportunities. On the other hand, the system could be used also into the other direction. The 
forecasting accuracy could be improved, if the decision-aid would alert the analyst that the 
current overoptimistic forecasts would put the stock into the highest buy portfolio. Adjusting 
the forecasts to match the analysts view on the right stock recommendation would be another 
practical application of the auto-recommendation model.
The analyst forecasts are the only way of getting educated guesses about future performance 
of the stocks for many investors that do not have their own buy-side research. Thus, they have 
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to deal with biased forecasts and especially with the biased recommendations every day. As 
we saw earlier, especially the recommendations have no investment value as such. Other 
researchers have found valuable information in the analyst recommendations, but usually it 
means heavy data manipulation such as looking only to downgrades in the recommendations. 
This makes it difficult to conduct investment strategies, because timing the transactions 
becomes a difficult issue. By utilizing the analyst forecasts in creating auto-recommendations 
based on simple value drivers, the investors could produce themselves better recommendations
out of the same analyst data. Moreover, the results of this study suggest that there are good 
opportunities to increase the profitability of the recommendations by improving the quality of 
the forecasts. For example, by trying to remove the some of the most obvious biases in the 
analyst forecasts the investors could possibly get superior returns as suggested when using the 
perfect foresight method in this study. For these kinds of purposes this study offers a 
straightforward framework how to use own forecasts as efficiently as possible in practice. As 
we saw in this study, the key to high returns are quality forecasts.
6.3 Suggestions for future research
From the theoretical viewpoint, this study suggests a new framework how to study the 
interaction between analyst forecasts and analyst recommendations. Already in the beginning 
of the 1990s, the two most influential surveys on equity analysts, Schipper (1991) and Brown 
(1993) called for further research on this matter. So far not that many researchers have really 
studied the field (Bradshaw, 2002). The framework based on simple value drivers could be 
used to determine when the analysts tend to have their forecasts right but their 
recommendations wrong and vice versa. This kind of analysis could provide further insights 
on the biases in the analyst forecasts and recommendations.  
More practically, the study could be easily extended to a larger set of value drivers. The 
perfect foresight method introduced in this study, can be applied to any items on the 
companies’ income statement, balance sheet or cash-flow statement. By looking at the driver’s 
capability of capturing the maximum buy vs. sell return, one could find good value drivers 
where people have not looked for them previously. As mentioned earlier, much of the 
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literature has been focused on historical fundamentals or a restricted number of items available 
from analyst forecasts. Some other items might prove to be good sources of forward-looking 
value drivers, but they have been overlooked in other studies.
Also the existing value drivers could be further developed. Especially, the more complicated 
ones, such as the PEG ratio, the P/RI ratio and the PB-ROE combination, could use more 
innovative approaches. First of all, many of these ratios suffer from strict data restrictions such 
as the requirement for positive earnings or positive growth. Overcoming this by some kind of 
alternative functional form could provide interesting results as more companies would be 
included in the sample. Also issues related to the easier and more accurate estimation of the 
residual income could provide interesting topics for future research.
Another suggestion for future research is to improve the quality of the analyst forecasts by 
systematically overcoming some of the most common biases in the forecasts, such as over-
optimism. Simple rules, such as cutting the forecasts of growth companies by 5% and 
increasing the forecasts of value companies by 5%, could result in better buy vs. sell returns as 
the quality of forecasts improves. Also the benchmark used in comparing the auto-
recommendations could be further developed. Many investors already follow only the changes 
in analyst recommendations because the plain recommendations themselves provide little 
value as we saw in this study. Also academic research has reported that following the revisions
in recommendations can lead to abnormal profits (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979 and Womack, 
1996). If all participants on the markets already look only at recommendation revisions, this 
would be a better benchmark for the value driver performance as well. However, these 
investment strategies have been accused of extremely tight requirements for perfect timing and 
high transaction costs (Barber et al., 2001).
The analyst recommendations could be also more specifically linked to the characteristics of 
the stock and surrounding environment. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) argue that analyst consensus 
recommendations work better for stocks with other favorable characteristics such as positive 
price momentum and low P/E ratio. In a similar manner the value driver performance could be 
studied separately for example for value and growth companies. Perhaps the value drivers 
could distinguish the best stocks from the worst better if the companies were more alike in 
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other aspects. Also the financial environment such as the economic cycle has an effect on the 
value driver performance as we saw in 5.1.2. It could be interesting to see if some value 
drivers work best in upturn and other value drivers in downturns. If the economic cycle could 
be determined using some external variable such as GDP growth, the value driver based 
investment strategy could switch between the value drivers depending on the current financial 
environment.
Finally, the study could be extended to other markets to see if the same principles apply there 
as well. For example, the small size of the Finnish stock market would probably create 
interesting additional requirements for the tested value drivers.
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8 APPENDIX 1
Backward-looking value driver definitions
Value Driver Formula Description
Price-to-book 
(P/B)
Stock Pricet / (Shareholders Equityt-1 / 
Number of Stockst)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Shareholder’s Equity t-1 latest from 
December 31st the previous year (Compustat)
Price-to-
earnings (P/E)
Stock Pricet / (Net Income t-1 / 
Number of Stockst)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Net Income t-1 latest from December 
31st the previous year (Compustat)
Price-earnings-
growth (PEG)
Stock Pricet / ((Net Income t-1 / 
Number of Stockst) / (Net Income t-1 / 
Net Income t-2-1) * 100)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Net Incomet-1 latest from December 
31st the previous year and Net Incomet-2 latest from 
December 31st the year before that (Compustat)
Price-to-
residual income
Stock Pricet / ((EBITt-1 * (1-0.35) -
Invested Capitalt-2 * 0.07) / Number of 
Stockst)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), EBITt-1 latest from December 31
st the 
previous year and Invested Capitalt-2 latest from 
December 31st the year before that (Compustat)
Debt-to-equity Long-term Debt t-1 / Shareholder’s 
Equity t-1
Long-term Debtt-1 and Shareholder’s Equityt-1 latest 
from December 31st the previous year (Compustat)
Earnings 
growth 
(Growth)
(Net Incomet-1 / Net Incomet-2 - 1) Net Income t-1 latest from December 31
st the previous 
year and Net Incomet-2 latest from December 31
st the 
year before that (Compustat)
Return on 
equity (ROE)
Net Incomet-1 / Shareholder’s Equityt-2 Net Income t-1 latest from December 31
st the previous 
year and Shareholder’s Equityt-2 latest from 
December 31st the year before that (Compustat)
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Forward-looking value driver definitions using perfect foresight
Value Driver Formula Description
Price-earnings-
growth (PEG)
Stock Pricet / ((Net Incomet / Number 
of Stockst) / (Net Incomet / Net 
Income t-1-1))
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Net Incomet latest from December 
31st the same year and Net Incomet-1 latest from 
December 31st the previous year (Compustat)
Price-earnings-
growth 
substracted 
(PE-G)
Stock Pricet / ((Net Incomet / Number 
of Stockst) - (Net Incomet / Net 
Income t-1-1) * 100)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Net Incomet latest from December 
31st the same year and Net Incomet-1 latest from 
December 31st the previous year (Compustat)
Price-to-
earnings (P/E)
Stock Pricet / (Net Incomet / Number 
of Stockst)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Net Incomet latest from December 
31st the same year (Compustat)
Price-to-
residual income
Stock Pricet / ((EBITt*(1-0.35)-
Invested Capitalt-2 * 0.07) / Number of 
Stockst)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), EBITt latest from December 31
st the 
same year and Invested Capitalt-2 latest from 
December 31st the previous year (Compustat)
Return on 
equity (ROE)
Net Incomet / Shareholder’s Equityt-1 Net Incomet latest from December 31
st the same year 
and Shareholder’s Equityt-1 latest from December 31
st
the previous year (Compustat)
Price-to-book 
(P/B)
Stock Pricet / (Shareholders Equityt / 
Number of Stockst)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Shareholder’s Equityt latest from 
December 31st the same year (Compustat)
Earnings 
growth 
(Growth)
Net Incomet / Net Income t-1 - 1 Net Incomet latest from December 31
st the same year 
and Net Incomet-1 latest from December 31
st the 
previous year (Compustat)
Price-to-book 
vs. ROE (PB-
ROE)
(Stock Pricet / (Shareholders Equityt / 
Number of Stockst)) – (Net Incomet / 
Shareholder’s Equityt-1)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Shareholder’s Equityt and Net 
Incomet latest from December 31
st the same year and 
Shareholder’s Equityt-1 latest from December 31
st the 
year before that (Compustat)
Magnified 
Price-to-book 
vs. ROE 
(10*PB-ROE)
10* (Stock Pricet / (Shareholders 
Equityt / Number of Stockst)) – (Net 
Incomet / Shareholder’s Equityt-1)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), Shareholder’s Equityt and Net 
Incomet latest from December 31
st the same year and 
Shareholder’s Equityt-1 latest from December 31
st the 
year before that (Compustat)
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Forward-looking value driver definitions using analyst forecasts
Value Driver Formula Description
Price-to-
earnings (P/E)
Stock Pricet / EPS_Y1t Stock Pricet from March 31
st year t (CRSP), one year 
Earnings per Share (EPS_Y1t) consensus forecast 
from March  the same year (IBES)
Price-earnings-
growth (PEG)
(Stock Pricet / EPS_Y1t) / ((EPS_Y1t  
* Number of Sharest) / Net Income t-1 -
1) * 100)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
year t (CRSP), one year Earnings per Share 
(EPS_Y1t) consensus forecast from March the same 
year (IBES), Net Incomet-1 latest from December 31
st
the previous year (Compustat), 
Price-earnings-
growth 
substracted 
(PE-G)
(Stock Pricet / EPS_Y1t) - ((EPS_Y1t  
* Number of Stockst) / Net Income t-1 -
1) * 100)
Stock Pricet and Number of Stockst from March 31
st
(CRSP), one year Earnings per Share (EPS_Y1t) 
consensus forecast from March the same year 
(IBES), Net Incomet-1 latest from December 31
st the 
previous year (Compustat), 
Earnings 
growth 
(Growth)
(EPS_Y1t  * Number of Stockst) / Net 
Income t-1 - 1
Number of Stockst from March 31
st year t (CRSP), 
one year Earnings per Share (EPS_Y1t) consensus
forecast from March the same year (IBES),  Net 
Incomet-1 latest from December 31
st the previous year 
(Compustat),
Return on 
equity (ROE)
(EPS_Y1t * Number of Stockst) / 
Shareholder’s Equityt-1
Number of Stockst from March 31
st year t (CRSP), 
one year Earnings per Share (EPS_Y1t) consensus
forecast from March the same year (IBES), 
Shareholder’s Equityt-1 latest from December 31
st the 
previous year (Compustat)
